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In my utopia, human solidarity would not be seen as a fact to be recognized 
by clearing away prejudice or burrowing down to previously hidden depths 
but, rather, as a goal to be achieved. It is to be achieved not by inquiry but 
by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow 
sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but credited. It is created 
by increasing our sensitivity to particular details of the pain and humiliation 
of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. 
Richard Rorty (1989), Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 
Excerpt from: The South African 2002 National Budget Speech by Finance 
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There have been many perspectives and arguments put forward to describe the 
current state of post-apartheid South Africa's political economy. These have 
generally tended to depend on which side of the ideological spectrum one resides. 
Due to the chronic levels of poverty and inequality that South Africa faces, 
debates on economic policy have become fundamental to the new regime. Many 
have become perplexed and frustrated by the ruling party's approach to this 
debate. This is as the broad democratic movement was always thought to favor 
social policies when presented with political economic thesis. Whilst others 
believe that government has played too great a role post-1994 and should take 
more of a backseat in favor of the market. The result has been a debate which has 
moved beyond the ideological stand-offs of the past, to a new arena of 
contradictions and practical analysis. What is clear is that the ANC has 
fundamentally shifted its economic philosophy since the context of liberation and 
struggle. This research seeks to make sense of this evolution and to present a 
theme of pragmatism and convergence. 
This thesis argues that the ANC-Ied government's movement towards 
conservative fiscal policy is primarily based upon two key limitations and 
constraints that have become a reflection of their current convergent stance. 
These fundamental influences have been the impact of the ANC's interpretation 
ofthe globalization hegemony, and the nature and purpose of the South African 
transition from apartheid to democracy. 
These two areas of influence have dictated the formulation and implementation of 
ANC macro-economic policy. First, the impact of globalization has proven an 
undeniable factor in domestic government policy. The ANC's reading of 
globalization as an 'irreversible train' that reflects the hard truths of a developing 
market in the current global political economy has meant that a certain arena has 










Secondly, on the domestic level, this paper argues that the nature of the South 
African transition has severely constrained the mantra of the new regime. The 
corporatist solution ensured that many interest groups have been afforded a stake 
in the 'new dispensation'. However, because of the elite nature of the process, 
certain interest groups have been prioritized. The South African solution saw the 
'new' become incorporated into the 'old' as opposed to the old being replaced. 
This has resulted in the 'national democratic revolutionary forces' taking over the 
reins of the political sphere, whilst the economic realm or private sector has 
largely remained under the control of the established status quo. This has led to 
constraint and restriction in the arena of political economic debate and the 
spectrum available to governmental policy. This reality has dictated the 
relationships and policies that have emerged out of the post-transition phase, 
beginning with the Government of National Unity (GNU). 
As the ANC continues to grapple with attempts to reconcile their undeniable 
'struggle' ideology with the perceived new reality of macro-economic stringency, 
the result has been a contradictory yet convergent debate. The juggling of ideals 
such as redistribution and 'ubuntu' with privatization and 'sound macro-economic 
fundamentals, has led to seeming different arguments being presented to different 
fronts. This research seeks to make sense of these contradictions and to present 
merely one perspective on the factors that have contributed to the nature of the 
new reglme. 
Then President De Klerk's momentous speech in February of 1990, which 
effectively allowed for the release of all political prisoners and the unbanning of 
various liberation organizations, took place in a rapidly globalizing world order. 
It had become increasingly clear that the apartheid regime could not afford to 











It became the task of negotiators for the new South Africa to firstly create the 
foundation of political stability. Without political stability South Africa would 
not attract the amount of capital that was now frequenting the globe. Alongside 
this negotiation process for a politically free South Africa, there was a dual 
negotiation sequence. This took on a more corporate guise, as big business now 
identified the ANC as inevitably taking control of the state. It was the task of 
such business groups along with the help of international consultation teams, to 
economically influence an organization based on the nationalist ideals of the 
revolution. The resultant corporate pacts between varying South African elites 
would condition the new democracy and highly influence the contested arena of 
national economic policy. 
Establishing the Research Parameters 
This project takes an IPE approach to illuminate the genesis of macro-economic 
policy under the ANC government. The interaction of globalization and the 
global market with post-Apartheid South Africa and subsequent national 
economic policy, serves as the key analytical focal points. This paper presents 
merely one perspective and is fully aware that many positions and arguments 
could be made to explain South Africa's current 'messy debate' concerning 
economic policy and development. 
The paper sets out the following argument: 
The current ambiguity of contradiction and convergence of the post-Apartheid 
South African political economy is a direct result of the ANC's perception of the 
theme of limitation and constraint. The ANC has read certain global and national 
realities as placing consequent policy, action and debate in a very narrow realm. 
This has led governmental rhetoric to favor an attitude of pragmatism rather than 
a strict adherence to their ideological history. This paper is built on the premise 
that the ANC perceives: 
(1) the global political economy as uniting political economic forces In a 











(2) a global market place based on the theoretical tenets of competition, 
efficiency and productivity (Gilpin, 2000); 
(3) globalization as a process that has come into full bloom in the post-Cold 
War 1990's; 
(4) that a developing economy such as South Africa needs to be on board to 
reap any benefits; 
(5) non-participation equates to marginalization; 
(6) the state as a key player in African political economy, despite the 
dominance of the neo-liberal agenda; 
(7) the national transition from apartheid to democracy as ensunng a 
corporatist solution that has restricted the new regime; 
(8) that this solution has allowed for the advent of a knowledge based South 
African society 
(9) And, that Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is the correct route to 
address South Africa's white dominated private sector, inequality and 
poverty 
It is the task of this case study to closely analyze the connection between global 
processes and national realities. 
Hence, the questions of concern to this topic are: 
1. Why has the ANC embraced conservative fiscal policy? 
2. How has the ANC interpreted the hegemonic process of globalization? 
3. How has South Africa positioned itself in the global economy 
characterized by globalization? 
4. Why were the negotiations so important in influencing economic policy in 
South Africa? 
5. How has the ANC economic philosophy evolved over time, and how has 
this been reflected in post-1994 national policy? 
6. Has South Africa made any progress in the fight against chronic inequality 











7. Who are the key players in South Africa's political economy and how are 
they shaping South Africa's destiny? 
Organization 
This thesis is split into five chapters, which signify two fundamental sections. 
Chapter's one and two debate and outline the two perceived areas of vital 
influence over the terrain of post-apartheid political economic ideology. Chapter 
one examines the influence of globalization. The debate attempts to identify what 
the paper refers to when utilizing the concept and identifies the perceived schools 
of thought regarding the rise of globalization in the 1990's. The objective is to 
pinpoint how the ANC-led government has perceived the process and what this 
has meant for subsequent debate and policy in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Chapter two investigates the influence of the South African transition from 
apartheid to democracy. This chapter seeks to highlight why the negotiations 
were so important in shaping the new regime and the interest groups that would 
come to dominate it. The nature of the apartheid economy, which entrenched the 
structural cl;sis of poverty and racial inequality, forms the genesis of this case 
study. The elite nature of the corporate negotiations is identified as the defining 
process for economic policy in the new South Africa. The scenario planning 
sessions hosted by major South African conglomerates are thoroughly examined 
to identify key players and themes. The World Bank and IMF are identified as 
playing key consultation and facilitation roles. The chapter fundamentally 
examines the evolution of ANC economic thinking from the 1955 Freedom 
Charter through to the 1990 Harare ANC-COSATU economic policy planJ?ing 
session. This lays a foundation for an analysis of the ruling party's economic 
. policy from the RDP through to GEAR. 
Chapter's three and four, represent a second section, which takes a closer look at 
the inner goings on of the political economy of the new regime, and closely seeks 











globalization. These two chapters analyze two 'hot' topics of debate in post-
apartheid South African political economy and seek to identify their causal link to 
the factors discussed in chapters one and two. Chapter three begins by identifying 
the perspectives in the debate on political and economic restructuring which 
characterized the 1990's. Then moves on to examine the subsequent economic 
policies, namely RDP and GEAR. RDP is explained as representing a reflection 
of the structural crisis of the post-apartheid era and serves as a reminder to South 
African economic technocrats of the massive challenges that face them. RDP 
served as a fundamental 1994 election document that was sufficiently apolitical to 
ensure a smooth transition and had enough in it to satisfy the broad array of 
interest groups. GEAR is the plan that the government has adopted to achieve the 
goals of the RDP. It is a highly controversial document that has its origins in the 
ANC's analysis of globalization and the nature of the transition. 
Chapter four serves as an analysis of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as 
the vision of the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. This chapter investigates the plan 
and the players who are taking this strategy forward. The rise of Mbeki from 
negotiator, to deputy-president and finally president, is identified as key to the 
establishment of economic fundamentals within the ANC and South Africa. His 
vision for the political economy of the new South Africa viewed the introduction 
and success of BEE as elementary to the overhaul of the apartheid legacy of 
inequality. The policy would serve a dual purpose, to fight poverty on the ground 
and to create an ANC loyal private sector. The creation of a loyal black middle 
class is viewed by ANC conservatives such as Mbeki, as being key to the 
entrenchment of ANC political power. BEE's connection with GEAR is 
examined in order to demonstrate the ascendance of systemic capitalism in the 
South African context. 
Chapter five serves as an analysis of the current state of South African political 
economy in the face of the changing nature of the global political economy since 











as the only acceptable way forward to conquer the twin evils of poverty and 
inequality. 
Strategy 
This research moves between the three levels of analysis. Firstly, by undertaking 
a study of the IPE and the driving force of globalization, the paper adopts an 
international systemic focus. Secondly, by identifying the case of South Africa, 
the paper shifts from a systemic to a national focus. And finally, through the 
identification of key individuals in the formation of economic policy in the new 
South Africa, the paper shifts to the role of the individual. This strategy 
fundamentally understands the connection between these three levels. Of vital 
importance is the nature of the integrated relationship between the international 
and national levels. The global free market has enforced a dependent relationship, 
which has bound the destiny of the national with that of the international system. 
The integrated and open nature of the system has largely rendered South Africa's 
economic prosperity on activities elsewhere, namely at the heart of the market in 
the North. The development of marginal economies has become difficult, as the 
center of the system has come under increasing pressure due to corporate 
corruption and mismanagement having sent global markets into panic. 
This is a study of the from the perspective of the South African state. Despite 
the recent implementation of the A U in Durban and varying active regional bodies 
across the continent, nation-states remain the vital factor in African political 
economy. It is understood that the types and capacities of African states differ. In 
this regard, South Africa's relationship with the global market is largely different 
to many on the continent. However, what has become uniform is the 
marginalization of African states with rcgard to the global reproduction of wealth. 
Due to the dominant nature of the ANC in South African politics, it is safe to use 
the ruling party interchangeably with the state. The assumption made is that no 











constraints. The formation of the BWI system has meant that all have become 
pegged to the same international system. 
Finally, this rcscarch adheres to a political-economic framework of analysis. 
J.CL Simonde de Sismondi wrote in 1815, "Political Economy is the name given 
to an important division of the science of government. The object of government 
is, or ought to be, the happiness of men, united in society; it seeks the means of 
securing to them the highest degree of felicity compatible with their nature, and at 
the same time of allowing the greatest possible number of individuals to partake 
in that felicity." (1815: 1). Centuries later this remains at the heart of the science 
and continues to be the task of government. What has changed, however, is the 
international nature that this activity has now undertaken. 
At its most fundamental, political economy, as utilized by the likes of Roger 
Tooze, Robert Gilpin and Susan Strange, is the interaction between political and 
economic activity. Frieden and Lake (1991) define economics as the 'system of 
producing, distributing and using wealth', and politics as, ' the set of institutions 
and rules by which social and economic interactions are governed'. For some, 
political economy refers to the various means by which government policies and 
institutions influence the market. And conversely for others, the focus is upon the 
ways in which the market molds government policy. This has become of 
increasing importance as economics has come to predominate global relations, as 
was born out of frustration at the traditional narrow political focus of International 
Relations. 
The fundamental conflict in IPE according to Balaam and Veseth (1996) is 
between the interests of the individual and the broader interests of the society at 
large. This is the tension between the market (individuals engaging in self-
interested/private activities) and the state (the undertaking of the collective 
action). The state can be defined as the political institutions of the modern nation-











and a well-defined territory and population, with the government having the 
capability of exercising sovereignty over this political space (Balaam and Veseth, 
1996: 5). The market on the other hand, includes those individual actions and 
decisions that fall largely into the private sphere. These are the economic 
institutions of modem capitalism that are dominated by self-interest and 
formulated by the guise of competition (1996:6). These two concepts have an 
inherent tension and embrace fundamentally different basic values. This 
contestation of power and wealth is at the heart oflPE. 
As the world has become globalized it has become important to investigate the 
interrelationship between international processes and domestic action, giving rise 
to the IPE approach. This has come into prominence in the post-Cold War era but 
has its origins in classic imperialism and hegemony. The field should be 
conceptualized in the realm of International Relations, beginning with Realism in 
the 1950's and 1960's. In fact, Strange (1984) argues that orthodox IPE has 
traditionally been a reflection of US foreign policy and has transformed as the US 
has reformulated its role in International Relations. 
At its most fundamental, Tooze explains that IPE is the analysis of the overlap of 
four key areas: international politics, international economics, domestic (national) 
politics and domestic economics. Tooze explains, " In fact, it was only by 
breaking down traditional distinctions between the international and the domestic, 
and between politics and economics, that IPE scholars were first able to 
understand some of the complex linkages between international and economic 
that are still with us today" (Tooze and Murphy, 1991: 2). For Gilpin, at the heart 
of these linkages is the relationship between society, the market and the state. He 
describes the relationships between these concepts having, "profoundly shaped 
the course of modem history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study of 











The period roughly from 1975 until the tum of the century, saw the fundamental 
breakdown of distinctions between politics and economics, and the international 
and the national. This has largely been a result of the globalization process. This 
has lent to the need for the expansion of knowledge in this field to break down the 
traditional narrow focus. Indeed, poverty, inequality and hunger, have 
increasingly become political tools. One way has been to investigate the role of 
new players in IPE, players who fall outside of the traditional US focus. It is in 
this regard that this research seeks to contribute. Tooze explains his frustration at 
the US dominance of the field, "Similarly, many of uS ... are more concerned with 
the involvement in the global political economy of people who are often ignored 
because they are considered less powerful" (1991: 6). 
During the negotiations for the new South Africa, whites gave up the sphere of 
the 'political' to concentrate on the realm of the 'economic'. This was considered 
a move in line with the times as International Relations became concerned with 
economic issues. It was argued that stability in the 'political' sphere was vital 
before economic prosperity. Post-Apartheid South Africa has seen these two 
spheres become mutually reliant. Business needs conducive economic policy and 
entrenched political stability to flourish. And, government needs the success and 
investment of the private sector in order to survive. Added to this, is that this 
entire picture is fundamentally influenced by the systemic level, an influence that 
has grown ever louder. 
In sum, this paper treats economICS and politics as simultaneous phenomena. 
And, in understanding our case of national economic activity in South Africa, we 
witness the increased influence of the systemic level. This gives us a complete 












"THE IRREVERSIBLE TRAIN": THE FORMATION OF POST-
APARTHEID ANC ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACE OF' 
GLOBALIZATION 
"Perhaps the most difficult aspect of globalization is that it is associated with a 
rise in inequality even when it brings improved living standards. This is not a 
welcome prospect, especially given our inherited inequalities and the existing 
chasm between rich and poor." (Baskin, 1998) 
"And so we return to a question with which we began. Is the state in Africa part of 
the solution or part of the problem?" (Wilson, 2001) 
(a) Introduction 
It is the initial focus of this research to describe the global neo-liberal order in 
which we now live with regards to the phenomenon of globalization. It is the 
objective of this section to outline what exactly is meant by globalization and to 
analyze what its effects have been for the prospects of economic policy in South 
Africa. It is a study of the present state of the global economy in order to 
investigate the interrelationship between the globalization process and the 
potentiality for domestic economic policy in an African context. This section is 
undertaken with the intention of setting the framework for how a marginalized 
state, such as South Africa, has positioned itself in this globalized economy. This 
is in order to present the inherent contradictions, constraints and possibilities that 
now face post- 1994 South Africa. 
From the time of the unbanning of the national democratic movement and the 
beginning of the negotiation process in 1990, mainstream ANC economic thought 
has tended to view globalization as an 'irreversible train' upon which South 
Africa needs to board or face the prospect of marginalization. The consultation 











tanks were fundamentally viewed as reflecting global political-economic realities 
which South Africa would need to adhere and engage. As vigorous or activist as 
the government's policy vision may have been post-apartheid, the inescapable 
reality was that globalization was in full bloom. That perceived reality, contained 
consequences for South Africa's government policy and therefore the people of 
South Africa. The ANC at the time agreed with the view that: 
" The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolizing the collapse of communism; the 
increasing pace of trade liberalization marked by the end of the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT negotiations in 1994 followed by the establishment of the WTO in 
1995 and the subsequent downward pressure on tariffs ... unrestricted flows of 
short-term capital around the world; the huge acceleration in the speed of 
information flow brought about by the growth of the internet in the same period, 
all combined to change not only the environment in which the countries of 
Southern Africa operated but also the political and economic realities inside these 
countries themselves." (Wilson, 2001 :2) 
Amidst these transformations, economIC globalization became conceptualized. 
The post-Cold War victory of the West saw the establishment of heightened trade 
between countries, capital flows, multinational enterprises, and technology 
(Hayter, 1999). Global institutions such as the Ul\l, IMF, WTO and World Bank 
have attempted to dictate or influence policy at the national or international levels. 
" Given these processes and organizations that South Africa cannot ignore and 
that point to neo-liberal economic philosophy", it beeame clear to the ANC that, 
"there is no sign of a return to extensive involvement of the state in social 
welfare" (Wilson, 2001: 3). This represented to the ANC the prospect of very 
little room to maneuver as their 'struggle' ideals now had to take on a new guise. 
What has become clear of late is that subsequent economic policy and 
govenunent rhetoric has reflected these realities and has shaped a somewhat 
ambiguous vision and a messy debate. This vision at times seems to follow the 
stringent macroeconomic fundamentals of the neo-liberal agenda, yet at other 











scale privatization being confusingly shrouded in liberation rhetoric, and has at 
times placed the formation of a capitalist black middle-class at the center of 
attempts to facilitate a fundamental poverty-alleviation crisis. In sum, the ANC-
led government has viewed globalization as an unavoidable process and that 
despite the challenges of inequality in South Africa and IPE at large, stringently 
believes in the opportunities within the paradigm for the upliftment and 
development for its people. Their view of globalization is one where the state 
remains the focal initiator in maintaining stability and providing opportunity for 
those whom the market ignores. 
(b) What is meant by globalization? 
This section shall follow the literature on globalization and attempt to highlight 
the current academic influences on South African political and economic 
practitioners. Globalization has presented certain possibilities and constraints for 
South Africa and this has become clear in the current political-economic 
spectrum. 
Busch (2000) emphasizes the concern that because of the 'multi-disciplinary' 
nature of the literature concerning globalization, a single definition or summary of 
the field is an impossible task. In agreement this research seeks to identify 
'common threads' and to focus particularly on the changing role of the nation-
state in the debate. 
Described by Hay and Marsh (2000) as the "buzz word" of the 1990' s, 
globalization has found prominence in virtually all fields of social SCIence 
literature. Many view the process as positively integrating the globe in a value 
and wealth maximizing exercise that is increasingly reaching more of the world's 
desperate while maintaining and increasing the wealth of the core. Such a stance 
views the process as mutually beneficial to all, bearing in mind the natural 
inequality of liberal economics. This is to say that globalization has ensured or 











Others, mainly from the non-aligned South, view the process as a movement 
generated by the world's core to benefit the wealthy and to entrench the economic 
and political values of those in power. This preservation of the status quo has the 
intended or unintended effect of the exploitation and marginalization of those 
economies that cannot compete with the economies of scale, as seen in the 
industrialized north. 
Keohane and Nye (2000:15) examine globalization in terms of globalism and 
interdependence. For them, "Globalism is a state of the world involving networks 
of interdependence at multi-continental distances. The linkages occur through 
flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, and people and 
forces, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances. 
Globalization and deglobalization refer to the increase or decline of globalism.~: 
A distinction is made between globalism as a phenomenon with a long history and 
globalization as a process of increasing globalism in the present or the past. The 
intensity and complexity of globalism is described in terms of thickness and 
globalization is the "process by which globalism becomes increasingly tl1ick" 
(Keohane and Nye, 2000: 18). The degree of thickening gives rise to a density of 
networks, institutional velocity and transnational participation. 
McGrew (1992) agrees that the increased technological innovation and the 
internationalization of production and exchange have been the contributing 
factors to the present system. This is to say that globalization is a process 
associated with the compression of time and space leading to the ideal of a 'global 
community' that dominates contemporary thinking and discourse. Put simply, the 
sophistication of air transport, cyberspace communication and satellite 
connections are thought to have resulted in a geographical compression that 
connects us all in a common humanity. The form and nature of this common 
humanity is hotly contested with many in the developing world believing that it is 











can be seen as a symbol of Western economic and political domination on the rest 
ofthe world. 
Schrire (200 I) argues that it is important that we view globalization as process 
and not an outcome. He defines the concept as, "the processes based upon 
technology, which increase both speed and scope of linkages across state 
boundaries in areas including the economy, polity and culture" (200 1:447). 
Gilpin (2000) associates economic globalization with the enormous increase in 
international trade, financial flows and activities of multinational corporations. 
The process aspires to link more economies into this considered mutually 
beneficial global economic system. This process has resulted in an integrated 
global system with certain players becoming more predominant. The leading 
players being united in their belief in porous economic borders, increasing 
interaction between states, the aspiration of the market as the dominant entity, and 
the retreat of the state in the interests of the rich and the poor. Berger and Dore 
(1996) point out that massive increases in the flows on international capital over 
national boundaries are encountering less national regulation. Furthermore, the 
Bretton Woods institutions were believed to ensure the stability of the system 
characterized by interdependence and economic cooperation (Gilpin, 2000: 19). 
Gilpin utilizes statistics such as the increase of world trade from $57 billion in 
1947 to $6 trillion in the US dominated 1990's, to prove the immense wealth-
creating machine of global capitalism led by free trade. 
McGrew defines globalization as, "the multiplicity of linkages and 
interconnections between states and societies which make up the modem world 
system" (1994:23). He associates three processes that are at work as a direct result 
of globalization. Firstly, the worldwide nature of political activity has resulted in 
a 'stretching' of the global political playground. Secondly, the fact that 
organizations below the state are having increasing influence on global issues has 











agencIes and associated issues has resulted In the 'broadening' of influential 
global phenomena (1994:3). 
Manual Castells the Spanish-born globalization scholar from the University of 
California, Berkeley, explains that, " ... the global economy is that particular 
economy which has the capacity to work as a unit in real time, on a planetary 
scale ... " (200 1:3). Castells posits that this new economy can be defined 
according to three inter-related characteristics. Firstly, globalization has ensured 
that productivity and production is increasingly based on knowledge and 
information. The speed, scope and depth of knowledge and information 
dissemination have infiltrated all spheres of productivity. In other words, 
productivity has become entrenched in knowledge and information through the 
spread of information technology. Secondly, the new economy is indeed global. 
This means that most if not all jobs around the world are influenced by the 
fortunes of the core of the global economy. And finally, the capacity of this 
global economy is technological, organizational and institutional. 
Globalization's technological capacity refers to its ability to structure the globe 
through telecommunications and informational systems. The organizational 
capacity alludes to firms and networks organizing their activity into truly global 
operations. And, the institutional capacity refers to the processes of deregulation 
and liberalization, which allows for the unification of the economy to operate 
globally. In this guise it has become the task of national governments to comply 
with these regulations and to set up institutions to positively engage this process 
(Castells, 200 1). Therefore, the state needs to encourage creativity to set up a 
network society in order to partake in the internationalization of productivity with 
regards to goods and services. African states have thus far been the biggest losers 











(c) The Three Waves of Literature 
Thus far this section has highlighted what we mean by globalization, it is now the 
focus to trace the academic evolution of the concept and to locate the different 
perspectives that have accompanied this evolution. 
The triumphant VIew of the neo-liberal hegemony following the Cold War 
characterizes the first wave thinkers of globalization. This school was developed 
in the early 1990's by so called globalization high priests such as Thomas 
Freidman and Kenichi Ohmae. The first wave scholars viewed a world where all 
had come under a single global market. In their view the nation-state had become 
superceded by the prevalence of powerful MNCs whom were viewed as 
attributing no loyalties to any government. Such thought reflected the growing 
prominence of business elites at the time. Japanese political economy consultant 
Ohmae (1990) in his book, 'The Borderless World', describes a global market free 
of government control as information, capital, culture and labor flow openly in a 
'global village'. He describes that, "Government officials exercise power by 
regulating and deregulating the market, but their new role is to assume a backseat, 
not the drivers position, and to make sure that their country is benefiting fully 
from the best performing corporations and producers in the world, at the lowest 
possible cost to their people on a long term basis" (1990: 13). 
For first wave scholars such as Ohmae (1990) and Freidman (1999), the world 
was becoming an increasingly smaller place. With the increase in information 
distribution, the amount of people traveling, and the dominance of English, global 
political economic relations were becoming increasingly efficient and profitable. 
International and domestic governance was seen as a hindrance to the value 
maximization that such scholars held dear. This is reflected in Ohmae's vision, 
"In a sense, duty-free shops are the precursor to what life will be like in a 
genuinely borderless environment. The same goods cost the same amount of 
money no matter what country you are in. In none are the prices higher because of 











Freidman's (1999), Lexus and the Olive Tree, argues strongly in favor of the 
merits of this 'new' era of 'globalization round two' on the back of the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the rise of the United States to the position of global hegemon. 
He postulates a time defined by satellites and the Internet, which he views as 
"shrinking the world from size 'medium' to a size' small' (1999:xvi). 
Politically speaking, first wave thought on globalization fits in neatly with the 
argument championed by Francis Fukuyama's (1992), The End of History and the 
Last of Man. He argues that the victory of the West following the Cold War had 
ushered in an era led by the convergence of principled liberalism, democracy, 
individualism, market superiority and free trade. Furthermore, this assimilation of 
global priorities would importantly define a time of prosperity and political peace. 
Fukuyama importantly defines history in terms of political conflict, with his new 
era led by globalization, culminating in the victory of economics over politics 
thus viewing the end of political conflict in a time of neo-liberal utopia. 
By there own admission, this "borderless world" tended to represent the 'Triad' of 
North America, Europe and Japan. The opposing understanding of globalization 
foresaw a global community more multidimensional in nature. This argument is 
skeptical about states around the world converging to a United States led global 
movement espousing openness and the relegation of the state apparatus. 
Especially as many in the Third World view the state as the only protection from 
the vicious and unforgiving global market. Instead of everlasting peace and 
prosperity this school, led by Samuel Huntington's, 'Clash of Civilizations', 
envisioned a world rife with fragmentation and new forms of intense ethnic, 
political and economic conflict. In other words, the end of the bi-polar global 
structure would lead to increased national and ethnic priorities in an uncertain and 
anarchical world (Huntington, 1996). McGrew concedes that, "War and 
permanent preparation for war, political fragmentation, cultural diversity, and the 











features of the contemporary global system" (1994:2). Therefore, despite the 
influence of globalization, the world remains divided into 170 nation-states that 
continue to follow their own national interests. 
Schrire (2001) in agreement reaffirms that the first wave belief in a stateless and 
harmonious globalization is a flawed analysis. He explains that, "The political 
kingdom is far too well entrenched in human society to be easily vanquished. 
Conflict is endemic and will re-emerge sooner or later in one form or another" 
(2001:450). In addition, as the struggle for FDI intensifies, the state has come 
right back onto the agenda. "Even formally radical states in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America are competing with each other to become integrated into the global 
economy" (200 1:451). Gilpin (2000) concurs that despite the advent of 
globalization, the world is less integrated than in the pre war era. As he explains, 
"Try telling a Mexican or Korth African low skilled laborer that we now live in a 
global economy in which national boundaries have ceased to be important. In 
fact, much of globalization rhetoric is no more than the conceit of a rich and 
industrialized country" (2000:295). 
Second wave globalization thinkers such as Boyer and Dore (1996) and Hirst and 
Thompson (1996) typically challenge the first wave view that globalization is 
threatening the role of the nation-state or that the market has impinged on the 
state's ability to influence the international political economy or to address 
national economic policy. They openly reject the 'homogenization' thesis and 
point out that what first wave thinkers describe is a 'Triadization' of global 
political economy and certainly not a globalization. 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) in 'Globalization in Question " maintain that the state 
remains "an important site, medium and agent of globalization". They in fact 
contend, that the belief that a global free market in partnership with the 











Firstly, they argue that the "present highly internationalized economy is not 
unprecedented." They point to the process as being one of many evolutions of the 
international political economy since the 1800's. Secondly, they point out that 
truly transnational companies are relatively rare and that the belief that any such 
companies operate without allegiance to a nation state is a reflection ofneo-liberal 
idealism. "Most companies are nationally based and trade multinationally on the 
strength of a major national location of production and sales" (1996:2). Thirdly, 
they fundamentally challenge the' global' in globalization. Their argument is that, 
"capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment 
from advanced to the developing countries. Rather, FDI is highly concentrated 
among the advanced industrial countries and the Third World remains marginal in 
both investment and trade" (1996:2). Thus, whilst the 'Triad' or G-3 superpower 
economies continue to concentrate capital amongst themselves, the world 
economy is a reflection that is far from global. Finally and at the heart of the 
Hirst and Thompson argument, is that if these superpowers hold such a monopoly 
over the international political economy they thus have the capacity to engage in 
constructive governance over financial markets and capital flight. Theirs is a 
belief that global markets are not beyond regulation and that effective control at 
the international level need not undermine national governance (1996:3). 
In a similar vein Boyer and Drache (1996) challenge the first wave school by 
maintaining that the "nation-state remains the conduit for investment". They 
believe that those who uncritically follow the market will encounter average 
economic results and will face the scourge of unemployment and poverty. They 
posit that globalization has put the state right back on the agenda albeit in a 
reformed and innovative manner, "Markets are efficient in allocating scarce 
resources in the short-run. By contrast, the nation is the conduit for investing in 
the future. Moreover, the state organizes the market by ensuring transparency, 











In sum, the second wave school focuses on the political nature of globalization in 
the belief that pure economics has not defeated political realities. They prioritize 
the state as the locus of engagement and emphasize that the 'borderless world' 
does not exist for the majority of the world's peoples and that the imposition of 
such an ideal on the entire globe would inevitably result in unevenness and 
polarization. 
Building on the second wave perspective, Hay and Marsh (2000) in Demyst@ing 
Globalization, further seek to 'bring politics back in' and investigate the prospects 
for governance in the debate. They advance a third wave perspective of 
globalization literature which, "seeks to develop a multidimensional approach to 
the various processes that impact often in highly complex and contingent ways 
to produce the phenomena variously referred to as economic, political, social 
and cultural globalization" (2000: 3). This is to critique the, at times over-
exaggerated claims, made in the name of this new fashionable area of study. 
They argue that analysts need to comprehensively "capture the complexity and 
contingency of contemporary change" (2000:3). 
This relatively new third wave is therefore a post-disciplinary approach that seeks 
to engage in 'complexification' in order to fully 'demystify' and unpack 
simplistic claims made by scholars of this 'process with no subject'. Hay and 
Marsh (2000) are severely critical of those who posit the 'inevitability' argument 
and fully reject the perspective that views globalization as 'a process working 
independently of the actions of real subjects.' In 'bringing the subject back in' 
they seek to 'invert the conventional causal logic and conceive of globalization as 
the independent rather than the dependent variable" (2000: 8). In essence third 
wave thinkers argue that there is no such thing as a process that is forcing the 
hand of the state to deregulate, for macroeconomics to converge and for cultures 
to homogenize. And if there is, it is by no means global nor as intense as 












It has been the task of this theoretical section to investigate the broader 
restrictions and influences that have come to bear on the South African political 
economic psyche coinciding with the advent of the negotiations in 1990. It is 
largely naIve to believe that a future ruling party would blindly and stringently 
adhere to purely one interpretation of a fundamental concept such as 
globalization. However, it is the argument of this section that certain realities 
have been taken from the broader analysis and is reflected in current ANC-led 
economic policy. 
From the first wave analysis, the ANC did register that globalization is in full 
bloom and that South Africa needed to be on board or face marginalization. This 
was reflected in a willingness to open the South African economy and to engage 
the global political economy. On the back of the Cold War and following the 
collapse of the welfare state in the Eastern bloc of Europe, it was always unlikely 
that an economy being set up in the 1990's would reject the globalization thesis. 
Bearing in mind South Africa's geography and political economic development, 
ANC economic practitioners at the time found much truth in the argument of 
second wave thinkers. This is a belief in the position that globalization has 
advanced the role of the Third World state as they seek to rejuvenate domestic 
economics and compete for vital FDI. This argument posits that it is the task of 
such states to tap into the availability of creativity in national fiscal policy to set 
up institutions to foster capital flow. This is to invest in knowledge and talent to 
uplift desperate communities. In other words, unlike in the "borderless world" 
social policy was viewed as paramount as the future of the nation would be 
fundamentally influenced by 'political choices'. 
This fusion of purpose between the 'irreversible train' and the importance of 
social policy, has at times led to a messy debate and an ambiguous vision. Or put 











government has continuously emphasized their adherence to pragmatism as 
opposed to ideology, as a ruling party. It is a party, which has continuously had to 













THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: 'THE SPIRIT 
OF THE TRANSITION' 
"Oh South Africa, better be quick, times are wild. Yesterday was like many 
strange dreams, today a beautiful white light floods the beloved country." 
Lallitha lawahirilal, 2002 
(a) Introduction 
The corporate nature of the South African negotiated transition served as a further 
constraint for the new ANC-Ied government. The process involved momentous 
political maneuvering that resulted in widespread deals and agreements that came 
to define the nature of the 'new' state. It was a trying and complex process as the 
negotiators sought to include all in the settlement; this was no easy task 
considering South Africa's broad array of opinions and positions. But it became 
clear that the leading negotiators, the ANC and the NP, were determined to set a 
date for 'free and fair' elections. The eventual outcome was an election date set 
for the 2ih of April 1994, and a plan for a government of national unity (GNU) 
for the first term thereafter. 
This chapter argues that the negotiations for the new South Africa were pivotal in 
shaping the ideas that would come to reflect and embody the new nation. The 
process would fundamentally come to dictate the relationships and policies that 
would emerge. This paper makes the distinction between the negotiations for a 
political settlement that came to be known as CODESA, and the economic 
negotiations that took place on corporate farms and boardrooms all over the 
country. These corporate scenario-planning sessions became a frantic exercise to 
influence ANC economic thought, and thus the future of South Africa's political 












The South African transition from 'apartheid' to democracy that culminated in the 
historic democratic elections in April of 1994, was truly one of the 'miracles' of 
the twentieth century. The socio-political struggle on a continent cursed by 
colonial oppression and extraction seemed hopeless a few short years earlier when 
the country was ravaged by continual civil unrest and political violence. The 
political settlement that emerged from four years of negotiations defied history 
and rightfully earned South Africa the admiration and marvel of the rest of the 
world. Not only had the anticipated civil race war been averted but the process 
inspired a new unity and reconciliation in a historically troubled society wrecked 
by discord, pain and suffering. The new South Africa was built on the foundation 
of one of the most democratic constitutions in the world, a constitution that 
fundamentally banned discrimination of any kind and finally set a traumatized 
nation free. The hopes of millions of South Africans were placed in the hands of 
the new dispensation to finally bring about change and to lead the new nation into 
the 'Promised Land.' 
On the backdrop of systemically entrenched poverty and inequality as a legacy of 
'apartheid', economic liberation has proved far more elusive and complex than the 
political transition to democracy. This was partly due to the fact that the ANC 
was traditionally a liberation organization that historically focused its attention on 
the political overthrow of an unjust state and paid little attention to economic 
Issues. In fact, the ANC's official economic position up till 1990 was the 
nationalistic ideals of the Freedom Charter of 1955. In a changing economic 
world such ideals were outdated and the period from 1990 saw the battle of many 
interest groups to influence the ANC's economic philosophy and ultimate policy. 
The new Government of National Unity (GNU), led by then President Nelson 
Mandela, devised the Reconstruction and Development Program that outlined the 
economic crisis in South Africa and broadly identified the GNU's vision to 
achieve economic parity in the second most financially unequal nation in the 
world. Politics and economics have always been inter-linked in South Africa, and 











majority of its people. The program, with its emphasis on redistribution and 
development, was largely used as an election document and represented a mixed 
economy that was a result of the compromises of the transition. The program did 
well to highlight the desperation of South Africa's economic divide but lacked a 
clear plan of action. In 1996, GEAR, was introduced and signaled the 
entrenchment of economic orthodoxy in South Africa through a plan that 
emphasized conservative macroeconomic fundamentals. In five short years, the 
ANC went from an anti-imperialist and nationalistic movement to one 
implementing a homegrown structural adjustment. The program witnessed the 
economic evolution of the ANC as a ruling party that dedicated the country to an 
outward orientated growth strategy, which hoped to encourage much needed job 
creation. Inequality and poverty alleviation remain the mammoth challenges of 
the new state and only once this has been achieved can South Africa truly be free. 
This research seeks to examine how South Africa has positioned itself in the 
global economy. It is an investigation of the interrelationship between 
international political economic phenomena and domestic economic policy. This 
is bearing in mind that it is geographically positioned on the most economically 
desperate continent in the world and therefore far away from any dynamic 
markets. The paper examines why the negotiations from 1990-1994, were so 
important in shaping South African economic policy and largely conditioned the 
new state. This ties in with the investigation of how the ANC economic 
philosophy has evolved and been shaped over time. In other words, the case 
study focuses on how, in conjunction with the globalization thesis, the 
negotiations and the corporatist solution further constrained and restricted the end 
solution of ANC economic philosophy. Thus, a further contributing factor to the 











(b) Background: The Nature of the Apartheid Economy 
The fundamental task that faces South African policy makers today is to find a 
solution to chronic poverty. Poverty and inequality are twin evils that were a 
direct inheritance from the apartheid system. Historians Lester, Nel and Binns 
(2000) explain that racial segregation began in South Africa with the advent of the 
industrialization process. Following the South African War (formerly known as 
the Anglo-Boer War) at the beginning of the twentieth century, Blacks and 
Afrikaners were increasingly sidelined as the British imperialist power sought to 
monopolize South Africa's resources. The discovery of gold in the former 
Transvaal witnessed the formation of global capitalism with the establishment of 
British mining companies. The South African colony was now viewed as a 
capital asset to the crown. The mining companies soon realized that to fully 
exploit the newfound minerals they needed to establish a mass cheap labor force. 
Blacks were soon recruited from the surrounding rural areas to toil underground 
and retrieve the minerals that would build the South African economy. Lester, 
Nel and Binns (2000) describe how this process not only placed South Africa on 
the global economic map, but also solidified the country's future of deep 
economIC, political and social divide. The influx of British capitalism 
surrounding the discovery of gold and the establishment of a cheap black labor 
force led to racial divisions in the labor force in urban areas. In addition, rural 
African communities were put in American style native reserves and mine 
workers were placed in industrial zones in and around the urban mines and 
factories. And thus began the 'Two nation' system that the new South Africa 
continues desperately to overcome. The country began to take on a distinct 
economic divide between the races and between the rural and urban areas. To this 
day, the provinces with a progressive urban culture led by business continue to 
thrive, whilst the rural provinces head into economic decline. 
The fierce marginalization of African communities was perpetuated by the 
election of the National Party (NP) in 1948, which was a direct result of the 











imperialist and religious movement that sought the emancipation of the Afrikaner 
nation from the British. The nationalistic Malan administration officially 
introduced the political system of 'Apartheid', and blacks were formally excluded 
from white society through the advent of the pass laws. The growth of capitalism 
in the al:,rricultural sector meant that many mral Afrikaners were driven into the 
cities and were at a distinct economic disadvantage to their European 
counterparts. This led to the advent of the 'poor white' class in South Africa. 
Tensions began to empt between mining capital that sought free trade in order for 
South Africa to become globally competitive, whilst agricultural capital sought 
state protection in order to grow. This mutated racially and regionally based 
economy became ingrained and has influenced South African politics until this 
day. Apartheid entrenched this reality. The system created chronic levels of 
inequality between regions and races, and entrenched poverty in the marginalized 
African communities (Marais, 1998). 
In summation, the Apartheid economy was based on three distinct pillars. 
Firstly, the economic base has traditionally been the minerals-energy complex 
(Bond, 2000). The extraction and exportation of gold, diamonds, platinum, coal, 
and electricity has driven the global competitiveness of the Apartheid state. South 
Africa has been a leading traditional producer of 14 out of the worlds 26 leading 
minerals (Arnold, 2000). Secondly, an established agricultural sector largely 
made the pariah state self-sufficient during the days of economic sanctions. In 
addition, South Africa has been a considerable exporter of maize, fmit, wines and 
fish. Finally, South Africa has always had the most advanced manufacturing 
sector on the continent. Luxury goods such as motor vehicles are produced 
locally near to world standards and are in line with first world road, railway and 
air transport. The Apartheid manufacturing sector stmggled without access to 
foreign markets and has now been identified as an area for growth (Arnold, 2000). 
The 1960s were the pinnacle of the Apartheid economy as South Africa was 











politically strategic because of its extroverted anti-Communist stance. The 
Sharpeville massacre in 1960 brought the international spotlight on the Apartheid 
regime and relations with the international community began to progressively 
sour. However, in many ways Apartheid was largely allowed to continue because 
of the continual economic investment of global superpowers until the regime's last 
days (Arnold, 2000). 
The Apartheid economy compounded the structural crisis of uneven development 
by overproducing luxury products for the upper income market. Blacks, Indians 
and Coloureds were considered cheap sources of labor, and were therefore given 
second-class citizenry. Income distribution was extremely uneven and was 
accompanied by racially distinct access to basic services (Bond, 2000). Such 
phenomena gradually boiled under the surface and began to explode in the forms 
of civil unrest and violence. As the world increasingly became interconnected 
through the globalization process following the end of the Cold War, South Africa 
lost its appeal and began to economically decline from the 1970's. From around 
1973, growth rates dropped markedly. There was falling net investment, increased 
unemployment, falling average real wage rates and increasingly unacceptable 
levels of poverty and income inequality, which would become the breeding 
ground for civil unrest and the underground economy (Michie and Padayachee, 
1997). 
By the time of the transition in 1990, GDP growth had gone from 5.5% in the 
1960's, to 1.8% in the 1980's with the early 1990's viewing a disastrous negative 
1.1 %. Both fixed and private investment was down as the state of civil unrest and 
widespread sanctions had led to South Africa losing its competitiveness and 
capacity to loan its way out of trouble. In addition, large levels of capital flight 
and decreasing levels of personal savings were combining to cripple the economy. 
Years of military expenditure at the expense of domestic reform initiatives 
contributed to the recession of the 1990's as the cost of continual military action 











It became increasingly clear to the business sector that a racially based economy 
was not sustainable and that political stability was increasingly viewed as 
fundamental if South Africa was to tum its economic fortunes around. 
Macroeconomic indicators seemed to compound the situation. Marais (200 I) 
points out that by the 1990's all three of South Africa's traditional sectors were in 
trouble. Mines were shutting down or downsizing throughout the former 
Transvaal and the Free State, the manufacturing sector was in a crisis as exports 
were not competitive further than the region, and the agricultural sectors 
contribution to GDP had dropped from 9% to 6%. One saving grace was that the 
apartheid state had not fallen into a debt trap, a tradition that the new dispensation 
would continue. It became obvious that much needed growth would never occur 
whilst the country was in a continual 'State of Emergency'. The powerful private 
sector increasingly began to realize that Apartheid could not lead South Africa 
into the twenty-first century and that political change was needed if economic 
stagnation was to be turned around. 
The private sector, led by the powerful Anglo-American mining conglomerate, 
began to meet with ANC officials in Lusaka as early as the late 1980s. Official 
negotiations began in 1990 after the historic speech by then President De Klerk in 
February of 1990 in which he effectively released all banned political 
organizations including the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (Sparks, 
1994). The negotiations for the new South Africa began in earnest later that year, 
and the battle was on to shape South Africa's economic destiny. 
(c) The New Struggle: Corporate Scenario Planning and Social Contracts 
Patrick Bond (2000), in his examination of the negotiations from 1990 till the end 
of 1993, labels the process an, 'Elite Transition'. This was on account of the 
process largely being labeled as a corporate pact between the NP led state, the 
ANC central apparatus and big business. The result was a series of pacts and 











the state as opposed to the old state being overthrown and replaced. For Adam, 
Slabbert and Moodley (1997) the negotiations signaled a draw, both sides 
realizing that they could not violently defeat each other and that political stability 
was desperately needed before economic growth could get under way. The 
political restructuring at Codesa was part of a broader process to rebuild economic 
growth, which had steadily declined since the 1970s. Therefore, considering the 
political, social and economic conditions, there was no other choice but to go to 
the negotiating table. 
What resulted was a corporatist solution. The Apartheid state could not find a 
way to permanently suppress the challenge of the broad array of bodies that made 
up the liberation movement. And, the opposition could not find a way to 
physically gain control of the concentrated power of the state. Despite the 
desperation of the 1980's, there began the ambitious move to restructure the 
political sphere. South African capital was increasingly beginning to realize the 
futility of the NP led state repression. In their opinion, a negotiated settlement (as 
opposed to violent overthrow) served as the only opportunity to save South 
African eapital and for the troubled nation to have any hope of reintegrating into 
the global economy, an eventuality that had become so important following 
globalization (Marais, 1998). So as Govan Mbeki relates, "the oppressor and the 
oppressed came together to chart the road to a democratic South Africa" (in 
Lester, Nel and Binns, 2000: 246). 
The ANCs participation is especially interesting as we witness the liberation 
movement's evolution from revolutionary politics to that resembling a pragmatic 
orthodoxy. It is to witness the ANC church adapting itself from a liberation 
movement into a ruling party and engaging the domestic and global context in 
which it finds itself. Some tough decisions had to be made and the ANC worked 
within the confines and restrictions of domestic and international capital to come 
up with a position that would take South Africa forward. The nature of this tInal 











Many similar transitions to democracy around the world had been associated with 
extreme economic downturns. New nations when integrated into the global 
economy had traditionally struggled to receive investment. Globally intensified 
international competition, the fickle nature of global capital and the growth of 
protectionist tendencies on behalf of the developed world, made entry and 
survival exceptionally difficult for newly democratizing nations. Michie and 
Padayachee (1997) argue that South Africa had some advantages to these global 
developments at the time of its transition. Namely, it had a large and diversified 
manufacturing sector, it had been open to foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
many decades, it had a considerable banking and human resource base, it had a 
globalIy competitive edge in specialized activities (mining and the production of 
metals) and it was strongly believed that the economy would be favored by 
investment when reintegrated into the global economy (1997: I 0). It was strongly 
believed on alI sides that once the political sphere was stabilized the 'sleeping 
giant' of the South African economy would drive the nation forward. 
It is important at the outset therefore, to outline what each of the parties expected 
from the negotiations process. Within the ruling bloc, the aim was to fonnulate 
an outcome that ensured minority rights and that could 'modernize' South African 
capital in line with global trends. This was both a political and an economic 
process. Largely white big business sought two objectives. Firstly, to dismantle 
the exclusionary political/economic framework of Apartheid. And secondly, to 
institutionalize a democratic regime along the lines of the ideals of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, which had grown in international influence. Put simply, big 
business increasingly began to think globally and found the ideologically based 
racialized political system in South Africa to be economically counter-productive 
and a hindrance to their increasingly global objectives. 
According to Marais (1998), white South African capital sought from the new 











guidelines of structural adjustment. This was considered vital to commit South 
Africa to a new economic recovery path to deal with the economic crisis that had 
arisen from years of nationalistic policies. The conflict would arise as to what 
degree this would break or maintain economic practices of the past. This new 
reality would focus on the incorporation of a new black middle class into the 
previously white dominated private sector. The hope was for a depoliticized 
wealthy black body that would commit South Africa to a capital accumulation 
strategy. As explained by Adam, Slabbert and Moodley, "From the point of view 
of sophisticated business, what better government could be in power to deal with 
militant unions and the impossible tasks of satisfying an impoverished half of the 
population than a liberation movement under a moderate charismatic leader with 
universal legitimacy, yet also bound to work within the parameters of the 
economically feasible?" (1997: 172). It is important to note that business was not 
uniform in its views to be expressed at the negotiating table, but were broadly 
united in their desire for the need of a competitive outward orientated market 
economy in a broader context of political stability (Marais, 1998). 
From the perspective of the movement the process served as the victory of their 
efforts. They sought a settlement that would change the inequalities and 
injustices of the past, one that would put South Africa on the long awaited road to 
peace and prosperity. The focus of the ANC was on the political sphere as they 
sought the attainment of the powers of the state that was viewed as the symbol of 
their victory. The bclief was that only once such power was comprehensively 
attained, could they then formulate the future as they saw fit. This would come to 
be known as the 'two-stage' theory. Such thinking was largely associated with 
the liberation ideology of the late Cold War and has since become problematic in 
a domestic sphere controlled by the conservative forces of the private sector and 
in an international community represented by the dominance of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. The results of the negotiation process would largely prohibit 











would struggle to gain control of the economic apparatus, a sphere that the white 
minority now focused their efforts. 
The standoff was compounded by fears that both sides would resume the armed 
struggle of the past if a satisfactory agreement was not reached. Marais (1998) 
points out that many feared that the NP state (which had the advantage of 
controlling the state and had the support of capital) would return to its 'laager' of 
Afrikaner nationalism and would discontinue the process in favor of maintaining 
the exclusionary nature of the apartheid status quo. Furthermore, many feared 
that the ANC would return to the physical opposition of the 1980's if unsatisfied 
with the final deal. 
On the fringes of the process were three potentially violent groupings. The IFP 
of KwaZulu Natal was a region and an organization engulfed in political violence. 
Their leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi was visibly unhappy with the sidelining of his 
organization in the process and threatened to boycott the final elections. The 
ultra-right wing were also unhappy with the process and what it meant for their 
dominant position, they would attempt various acts of violence to destabilize the 
negotiations. Finally, the various homeland administrations were embattled 
during the negotiations and would also be a source of violence in response to the 
negotiated settlement (Sparks, 1994). 
In the end the pact reached would revolve around the NP, the ANC and big 
business. Various behind the scene deals ensured that sidelined groups were 
incorporated although their influence would be curtailed. Adam, Slabbert and 
Moodley (1997) believe that the transition was peaceful largely due to the 
corporatist nature of the endeavor. The deal tapped into the vast resources of the 
state and the private sector. This allowed for troublemakers to be bought out and 
put on the pay role, and for retrenchment packages and pensions to be swiftly 
dealt with. This would prove vital in the restructuring of the National Defense 











civil war continued to reverberate out of all quarters, it was the task of the elite 
pact of business, thc NP state and the ANC to get certain destabilizing elements 
firmly in the new broad church. It would be this church that would carry South 
Africa 'kicking and screaming' through this volatile time. 
The negotiation process put the ANC as the future ruling body, in the delicate 
position of having to satisfy both the demands of the privileged white business 
sector and the voiceless impoverished masses. The representation of many 
interests, ideologies and ethnicities would be a task the ANC would need to learn 
quickly on taking control of one of the most divided countries in the world. Such 
a reality would give rise to the necessity for nation building and common purpose 
articulation, a task that would be led by the new President Nelson Mandela 
(Marais, 1998). 
Once the decision had been made to enter into a negotiation process, the struggle 
for the new South Africa took on a fundamentally new form. This was from an 
armed operation from the bush of exile alongside domestic civil protest led by the 
United Democratic Front (UDF), to the boardrooms of Johannesburg and the high 
profile corporate game lodge getaways in South Africa's vast nature reserves. 
Alongside the Codesa talks, which began at the World Trade Center in 
Johannesburg on December of 1991 for the end of apartheid and the restructuring 
of the political sphere, was an aggressive corporate initiative to influence the 
ANC economic philosophy and in so doing shape future national economic policy 
(Sparks, 1994). After all, this was the organization that was thought to lead the 
'Red' invasion of Southern Africa less than a decade ago. As mentioned earlier, 
the ANC had focused its liberation efforts on the attainment of the political power 
of the state and by its own admission had paid less attention to the economic 
liberation of the country. It was thought that control of the state would allow the 
ANC to economically restructure the country as they saw fit. The nationalistic 
Freedom Charter remained the economic philosophy of the revolutionary 











labor led trade union movement (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). The belief in redistribution as a spur for growth as outlined by the 
1990 'Discussion on Economic Policy', served as a uniting force among the 
alliance members that proved to be short lived. Mainstream economists and the 
media soon dismissed the policy as populist and short sighted in its 
macroeconomic fundamentals. This history of broad economic slogans of 
principle severely constrained the ANCs capacity at the negotiating table (Marais, 
1998). 
The question of relevance therefore, as posed by Bond (2000), is how such a 'left' 
leaning revolutionary organization that was governed by labor and nationalism, 
carne to be seduced by the neo-liberal agenda. In other words, how has the so-
called 'left' continually been silenced (the endorsing of the GATT in 1993 is a 
case in point) in economic debate? This is as ANC technocrats moved from the 
idealistic Nationalism of the Freedom Charter, to the Keynesian approach agreed 
upon at the ANC-COSATU Harare conference of 1990, and eventually to the neo-
Liberal structural adjustment of GEAR. This ushered in the term 'Comrades in 
business' as former union members set up investment initiatives. This reality 
would allow for someone such as Cyril Ramaphosa to move from the leadership 
of the National Mineworkers Union to become one of capitalism's favorite sons as 
CEO of one of the country's most powerful conglomerates. This shift in focus led 
to redistribution and development being replaced by a focus on 'economic 
fundamentals', such as stabilization and growth. 
The social contract scenarios from 1990-1994 involved behind the scenes deal 
making in which the ANC delegates were wined and dined a steady neo-liberal 
diet from South Africa's business conglomerates and the consultant teams from 
the IMF and the World Bank. The negotiations were undertaken on the backdrop 
of a nation engulfed in political violence and unrest. All were keen to ensure that 
the new ruling elite fully understood the nature of the global economy and that 











the ANC mass action strategies and to forge a working relationship between the 
elites on both sides. In the words of Bond, "Above all, the early 1990's required 
from South Africa's elites a special effort: they had to learn each others basic 
objectives, philosophy and discourses, and they had to begin to make concessions 
mainly rhetorical, but to some degree concrete to build trust between 
negotiating parties with once vigorously opposed interests." (2000:56). 
The scenario planning sessions were crucial in the brainstorming of the ideal type 
economy and how the status quo needed to be changed. The delegates were 
ushered in the direction of neo-liberal and Keynesian philosophy, with very little 
alternative thinking accepted. The collapse of Second World socialism, the 
failure of the European welfare state and the surge in prominence of the BWI's 
and neo-liberal globalization meant that the sessions were treated as a reality 
check for all economic practitioners involved. The consultation teams believed 
that there was a new Global order in the making and that South Africa had to be 
tuned in to such developments and not to get left behind (Marais, 2001). This is 
the ideology that this research has labeled as the 'irreversible train' in the 
previous section. 
The key figures in setting up the sessions were Clem Sunter, Bob Tucker and 
Laurence Schlemmer from Anglo- American, Nedcor/Old Mutual and Sanlam 
respectively. It was a highly confidential and sensitive process and information 
was only brought to the public attention through selected leakages to the business 
press. In depth analysis was often over looked in favor of coming up with a deal 
that reflected a 'coerced harmony' across various sectors (Bond, 2000). Marais 
(2001) explains that the recurring themes included the instruction that future 
economic policy had to be grounded in a strong foundational culture of consensus 
building, and trust. The economic debate revolved around macroeconomic 
stringency, outward orientated practice and the facilitation of the state. 
Consultation teams clearly wanted South Africa to wipe the slate clean and to put 











the world. The reality of this was often expressed in melodramatic terms. Sunter 
of Anglo-Gold summed up the perspective of business when he said, "Negotiation 
works. Rhetoric is dropped, reality prevails and in the end companies concerned 
go on producing the minerals, goods and services." (Bond, 2000:58). 
The first attempt to forge a contract between the ANC, the NP, big business, labor 
and civil society, sought to promote economic orthodoxy and democracy as a 
priority over racialized politics and non- democratic principles. The Nedcor/Old 
Mutual, 'Prospects for a Successful Transition', was a scenario planning session 
in mid 1990. Tucker, who entertained the country's leading economic and 
political thinkers at the expense of Rl, 7 million of NedcoriOld Mutual funds, 
hosted the session. This showed the high priority that the conglomerate placed on 
being at the forefront of the process. The Tucker model sought an AN CINP 
coalition government that ought to strive for political stability. The scenario plan 
emphasized that once such a political ideal was in place the government should do 
all in its power to ensure high and sustained growth through the adherence to the 
market economy. The ANC were continually informed that only once growth 
was consistently high, could the state then embark on a redistribution program 
(Bond, 2000). Tucker's team emphasized that a compact was in everyone's 
interests as socio-economic reforms needed to occur before and not after the 
political transition. 
Broader South Africa at the time was expenencmg considerable township 
violence and the KwaZulu Natal political killings were spiraling out of control. It 
was particularly difficult to forge an a&rreement, as many believed at the time that 
the NP was largely instigating the violence as a secret 'third force'. Subsequent 
evidence has supported such claims. This issue eventually led to the breaking 
down of relations between Mandela and De Klerk, as the ANC accused the NP of 
having a double agenda. The June 1992 Boipatong massacre of 48 residents 
resulted in a minor crisis for the negotiations as the ANC walked out of Codesa. 











massacre of ANC supporters by the collaborative Ciskei state-troopers (Sparks, 
1994). 'Prospects' realized the instability of the time and emphasized the need for 
elites to make a pact that would force the rest of the country to 'get on board' 
(Bond, 2000). Despite its elite nature it was noted that the position was sold to 
many a member of the democratic movement. 
The second such scenario session was hosted by the Afrikaner based insurance 
company Sanlam in 1993. 'Plaiform jiJr Investment' was a conservative opinion 
on the political and economic phenomena in South Africa. The paper wamed that 
the pressure against a NP/ANC power sharing arrangement would be stark and 
thus the marriage had to be based on a firm foundation. The session realized the 
reality that no one power could get ahead in this process and that negotiators 
should stave off a 'quick fix solution' (Bond, 2000). Sanlam strongly believed that 
revolutionary elements in the ANC were increasingly being sidelined and that the 
majority ANC constituency had enough faith in their leaders to accept whatever 
was in the final agreement. 
The session was largely an assurance to business that the ANC leadership was far 
more moderate than they expected and that they would shift away from labor and 
costly redistributive elements. This was on account that the ANC leadership had 
a continuous relationship with the World Bank, the IMF, the business movement 
and the Development Bank of Southem Africa (Bond, 2000). Furthermore, it was 
presented that redistributive forces would continually be sidelined as they 
envisaged a corporatist outcome between business and labor. They argued that 
Cosatu's socialism was considered to be essentially non-Marxist and that the trade 
union would be moderated by their more 'sober minded' ANC exile leadership. It 
was the history of the Apartheid mind-set to largely overestimate the influence of 
the Unions on the ANC elite who would prove to be far more orthodox than white 











Bond argues that 'Platform', largely underestimated the growing frustration of the 
masses at the increasingly collaborative nature of the movement's elite's, and the 
ability of such forces to derail the process. The paper was void of any socio-
economic concessions and firmly ushered the ANC delegates away from any 
populist restructuring of the economy in favor of the poor. This particular 
plam1ing session did well to outline the reality of the South African case and the 
immense challenges that face a developing economy in the ruthless global market. 
Other sessions included the Mont Fleur scenarios hosted by the social democrats, 
'Growth for All' by the South African foundation, and SACOB's 'Economic 
Options for South Africa'. All of these scenario planning session's were 
remarkably successful in bringing elites into the fold and in sideling economic 
radicals. In other words, the process was crucial in deciding who was in and who 
was out. The ANC were aggressively presented theses which all made the 
fundamental point that in the current global arena there was 'no alternative' to 
economic orthodoxy. They were warned of so-called quick fix redistributive 
policies that had driven the struggle ideology against economic Apartheid. The 
final deal ensured that the ANC took over the reins of the political and economic 
sphere but that business retained sufficient clout to secure the maintenance of 
their prominent position by ensuring that the privatization of capital was placed as 
a priority over redistribution. The seeming open mindedness of the ANC elite to 
economic restructuring meant the intensification of the struggle for economic 
control of the new ruling bloc. As coined by Marais (1998), the conclusion of the 
negotiations signaled an emphasis towards the strategy of deracializing the 
privilege of South Africa's economic elite. 
Morris (1993) poses the important question, "Will the new society perpetuate the 
highly divisive social elitism of the past, but on a more non-racial basis? Or wiJI it 
tend towards a more egalitarian system that strives to muffle inherited frictions by 
redistributing resources and institutional power?" (1993: 8). The process did not 











inequality. The nature of the deals struck with corporate South Africa meant that 
economic empowering endeavors such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
took on an elite stature as a conservative interpretation of global economics and 
its driving force of globalization was adopted and implemented. Therefore, the 
'two nation' system would remain, but the key difference was that the top tier 
would become increasingly multiraciaL Morris (1993) would label this the 
prospect of the' 50% solution.' 
Therefore, despite the raging violence at the time, a corporatist pact was reached 
between all involved. The ultimate objective of preserving the South African 
nation state had been achieved as political stability was obtained through 
widespread consensus. The political deal involved the signing of Sunset Clauses 
that effectively made power sharing compulsory in a GNU. The ANC made 
promises not to purge the security forces and the civil service. A set of 
constitutional principles was established in an interim constitution that would 
evolve into the final constitution of the new liberal democracy. The constitution 
would prove to be one of the most progressive in the world and would make sure 
that South Africa would never suffer an oppressive regime again. The economic 
deal involved many concessions, the most important of which was the awarding 
of economic portfolio's to former NP economic technocrats such as Chris Stals 
and Derek Keys (Marais, 2001). 
Marais (2001) illustrates that by 1993 the language and rhetoric of the ANC and 
business policy documents were converging. The ANC leadership was shifting 
away from their activist roots of the 'developmental state'. Bond (2000) explains 
that the economically conservative side of the movement was beginning to take 
shape and would eventually come to dominate the macro-economic stance of 
government. The 1990 ANC-COSA TU policy conference, which decided on a 
mixed approach to be taken to the negotiating table, had all but died by the 
conclusion of the 1993 Sanlam planning session. Further signs of the shift 'right' 











This team was headed up by Vella Pillay and was set up by the ANC to lead its 
research into future macro-economic policy. Merg came up with, 'Making 
Democracy Work', in November of 1993. The paper largely represented the 
mixed approach of Keynesian economics and warned against the blind adherence 
to the market at the expense of social criteria (M ichie and Padayachee, 1997). 
Merg strongly advised against the Reserve Bank being allowed independence in 
the constitution, they believed a similar decision had facilitated the demise of 
Russia in 1993, and that South Africa should follow the tightly reined East Asian 
model. But the sentiments of Mandela on the topic of the independence of the 
Reserve Bank at the time indicated in which direction the ANC was moving. 
Mandela explained, tlWe argued for the independence of the Bank not only 
because we are committed to the sound economic management of the country, but 
also because we want to send out a strong signal to the international and local 
business and financial communities that we are serious about this commitment. tI 
(Marais, 2001: 134). And thus, 'Making Democracy Work', never got past a 
recommendation and Merg lost impetus to the ANC's Department of Economic 
Planning (DEP) led by Trevor Manuel. 
The DEP began to represent the conservative thinking on the rise in the ANC 
executive ever since Trevor Manuel and Tito Mboweni took over from Max 
Sisulu in 1990. Mboweni's recommendation that the Reserve Bank remain 
independent (effectively controlled by shareholders) was passed and enshrined in 
the debates of 1995 leading up to the introduction of the final constitution of 
1996. Sisulu took over Merg, which became the National Institute for Economic 
Policy. Leading decision-makers such as Jay Naidoo and Alec Erwin began to 
water down the Cosatu calls for nationalism, and labor's ideals of worker control. 
This signified a distinct power shift in the economic thinking of the party, as 
progressIves went silent against the dominant discourse that postulated 'no 
alternative'. With the elections of 1994 and the appointment of NP cabinet 











officially adopt a neo-liberal interpretation of globalization. This ideological 
framework would form the foundation of future policy formations. (Bond, 2000). 
In the words of Marais, "the task assumed by the ANC was to construct and 
administer a hegemonic project that would be based on a radical break with the 
exclusionary paradigms enforced under Apartheid." (2001: 93). To a large degree 
reconciliation and consensus took over from conflict and triumph. The 
revolutionary ideal of smashing the existing oppressive state was superceded by 
the replacement of the exclusionary state with an inclusionary one. With Mandela 
as its champion, the ideology of the inclusionary state became the driving force of 
the new South Africa. In this environment of reconciliation, the ANC 'exercised 
restraint' in their demands and in their pursuit of fundamental change (Marais, 
200 I). The struggle ended without a victor. The new struggle would be over 
whose interests would come to dominate South Africa's new economic path. It 
would prove difficult for the new administration to act decisively on economic 
policy as they were in "office but did not necessarily have power" (Adam, 
Slabbert and Moodley, 1997: 2). Thus, whilst the ruling party dominated the 
political sphere their ideas on social policy would be continually restricted by the 
perpetual white domination of the private sector. 
(d) 'The World Bank as a Knowledge Bank' 
The South African movement against Apartheid was traditionally exceptionally 
weary of the BWI's and the conditionalities that have accompanied loans to 
Africa. This was on account of the devastating effects of World Bank loans to the 
continent and the crippling effects that the debt crisis has meant for other African 
countries. Bond (2000) argues that the 'left' in the movement was successful in 
strongly advising against the temptations of widespread loans from the global 
financial institutions. This was at a time when the World Bank and IMF were 
desperate to find an African success story for its Washington Consensus style 
structural adjustment system, based on massive loans to achieve stability 











against such forces. Bond highlights one such example when he gives the case of 
how South Africa countered the World Bank acronym TINA (There Is No 
Alternative) with THEMBA (There Must Be an Alternative). Themba is a Zulu 
word for hope. 
Bond (2000) explains that the basis of the ANC's traditional skepticism is largely 
due to the BWI's historical support of oppressive regimes on the continent, none 
more so than in Southern Africa. A close examination of the activities of 
international finance organizations in the region, highlights their continual support 
of colonial rule and their financial backing of neo-colonial African kleptomaniacs. 
Bond points to the BWI investments being utilized to build white economies for 
the interests of white consumers at the expense of the oppressed. The example of 
the Kariba hydroelectric dam project on the Zambezi river, which was built for 
the direct benefit of the Apartheid state along with British and US multinationals, 
is illustrated as a case in point (Bond, 2000). Despite the rhetoric for democracy 
and development, the IMF and World Bank's interest in the continent was dictated 
by the Cold War geopolitics of the time. This required the blocking of the spread 
of Communism in the region, a reality which often resulted in the BWI's having 
bedfellows of the like of Mabutu Sese Seko of former Zaire, the most extreme of 
African dictators. Other partners included the vocally anti-Communist Apartheid 
state, the financial support of which perpetuated a system that committed some of 
the most heinous human rights abuses on the continent. To add to the woes of a 
traumatized continent, the victors of long fought after independence struggles, 
now had to face years of accumulated colonial debt or face being cut off from the 
world. Furthermore, such countries had to loan more in order to rebuild and to 
get battle weary economies up and running. These loans came with 
conditionalities that handed over power to international forces (Bond, 2000). 
In South Africa the World Bank continued to provide the Apartheid state with 
loans despite the calls by the ANC to impose sanctions following the Sharpeville 











million loan was granted to Pretoria. A further example was the funding of the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project that was used to provide much needed water to 
the farms and mines of the Transvaal region. BWlloans only began to halt in the 
1980s after pressure from the US congress. After supporting their enemy for so 
long it is no surprise that exiled ANC members were exceptionally weary of 
following the indebtedness they had witnessed in their host countries around the 
continent, and by allowing the influence of such a reality at the expense of 
domestic thinkers and practitioners. 
Despite not being allowed to gain physical influence through the provision of 
loans, the World Bank and IMF were able to influence the economic future of 
South Africa through the guise of influential consultation groups that frequented 
the economic planning sessions outlined above (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). 
They often teamed up with the old ruling bloc and big business to provide 
economic consultation to ANC elites who increasingly welcomed such advice. 
Specialist teams under Geoffrey Lamb, a former South African who was an old 
Sussex mate of Thabo Mbeki, would travel around the country advising on all 
economic matters from macro-economic policy to education, housing and health 
(Bond, 2000). The World Bank became increasingly involved in urban planning 
initiatives and would be a key influence in the planning of the RDP program, 
although the policy was extensively domestically funded. Furthermore, The Land 
and Agricultural Policy Center (LAPC) was a World Bank NGO that would have 
increasing clout over ANC rural housing policy from 1992-1994. In virtually all 
areas of economic policy formation, the World Bank was working behind the 
scenes to reach a market driven solution. 
Michie and Padayachee (1997) explain the different focuses of the two 
institutions. The IMF reports typically analyzed the possibility for sustained 
growth in a country dictated by poverty. They pointed to the need to liberalize 
financial relations as a strategy to eliminate balance of payment deficits required 











the country, emphasized the need for saving and closely examined the spending 
levels of the government. They called for the liberalization of trade by focusing 
on an outward looking economy dedicated to the attainment of FDI. The 
institution accentuated that this reality would only occur if the national currency 
was devalued and there was an abolition of exchange controls. The underlying 
message was that the new economy needed to focus on growth before they 
embarked on redistribution. Redistribution too soon was thought to cripple the 
spending power of the state and the economy as a whole. The IMF consultation 
missions were typically well received by domestic business. Other quarters 
widely criticized their synopsis as fundamentally underestimating the poverty 
crisis in the new country as well as the crippling lack of skilled labor as a result of 
a racialized economy. Such criticism was skeptical of the IMF style adjustment's 
ability to fundamentally change the patterns of inequality in the country, an 
objective that was thought to be the priority. 
The IMF did manage to issue an $850 million loan to South Africa on the eve of 
the 1994 elections. It was officially said to be for the rejuvenation of the 
agricultural sector in their bid to restructure around exportation, but many 
believed that it was to service Apartheid debt. Whatever its use, the South 
African letter of intent that is typically attached to the acceptance of such a loan, 
signaled the affects of the IMF's ideology on the new economy. According to 
Michie and Padayachee (1997), the new South African dispensation committed 
itself through the letter of intent to: the reduction of the budget deficit, reducing 
the civil service wage bill, committing to tight monetary policy, fostering 
investment and to liberalize the tariff system in conjunction with the devaluing of 
the national currency. This put the new developing economy firmly on the road 
to global integration. 
The W orId Bank missions focused on four broad areas. They concentrated on 
macroeconomic policy, employment prospects, public expenditure options and 











was influential at the time, the World Bank sought to commit the imminent GNU 
to an outward orientated sustainable growth led strategy. The consultants 
recognized the alleviation of poverty as the major objective of the new policies 
but that this could only be overcome in a market friendly environment. The 
fundamentals required (good economic fundamentals would become the watch 
phrase of the new regime) were geared to open up the South African economy to 
international competition and FDI. Future key economic players such as Erwin, 
Manual and Mbeki agreed with this strategy as the only alternative in the context 
of the time. In this light, the new ANC government needed to implement tight 
fiscal policies to keep balance of payments at a premium and to commit to the 
attraction of foreign capital (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). 
Such integrationist policies would prove to underestimate the crippling effect of 
massive amounts of domestic capital flight out the country, the fickle nature of 
foreign investors and their skepticism of the safety of their money in an African 
economy. South Africa would soon have to face the reality of skeptical 
investment, currency fluctuations and the lack of patriotism on behalf of the 
domestic private sector. All of which negatively affect job creation and the 
alleviation of poverty. 
In sum, although the BWI's did not achieve the leverage they desired through the 
granting of loans, they were able to influence policy makers through their 
comprehensive consultation campaign. South Africa's signing of the GATT in 
1993 and the letter of intent that accompanied an IMF loan of the same year, was 
a clear indication of what was to follow. Therefore, although not externally 
imposed, the GEAR program of 1996 under Finance Minister Manual, was a 
direct result of his education on neo-liberal idcals. Despite maintaining the 
struggle rhetoric of redistribution and equity, South African economic technocrats 
strongly placed their faith in free markets, FDI and high and sustained growth. 
South Africa adjusted to its new global and domestic climate of growing 











struggle ideals in a globalization context (Bond, 2000). This is what this research 
has called an ambiguous vision that has often yielded contradictory rhetoric. And 
conversely what government officials have termed a 'resolute pragmatism' 
needed by a ruling party. 
The initial discussions by the ANC and COSATU economists for a state led RDP 
strategy, would differ to the eventual RDP White Paper tabled before parliament. 
In the words of Robert Urquhart, the final document had a distinct BWI feel. 
"The White Paper is more neo-liberal in approach and harks back to some of the 
sectional documents of the Bank. It argues for the need to extend the 
international competitive edge to selected industries. The impression one receives 
then is a move away from interventionary RDP to an RDP which will rely more 
heavily on a freer market to promote growth and generate employment" (in 
Michie and Payadachee, 1997:45). 
(e) Summary 
Michie and Padayachee (1997) summarize the question of how the liberation 
movement became attracted to the neo-liberal paradigm that has dominated the 
globe since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, in so doing, entrenching South 
Africa's future relationship with the global economy. These can be summarized 
by five factors surrounding and involving the negotiation process that have been 
discussed in this section. 
Firstly, there has been a lack of economic policy debate within the ANC 
throughout its history of struggle. The Freedom Charter remained the official 
policy document up to 1990 despite its outdated ideals. As mentioned, the 1990's 
were a tumultuous time for economic debate and the ANC delegation carne under 
assault from international and domestic capital and the Apartheid state. During 
this period the ANC would be exposed to a series of scenario planning sessions of 
'executive training programs' by foreign business, domestic big business, 











economic views by the time of election in 1994 that resulted in incoherence and a 
lack of solidarity (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). 
Secondly, there was also a series of conflicting policy positions with regards to 
the role that international financial institutions such as the World Bank should 
have in the reformulation of the South African economy. Views ranged from 
being strongly opposed to their presence and that South Africa should avoid all 
contact from such imperial institutions, to those who broadly accepted their ideals 
and believed that South Africa had much to learn from the leaders of the global 
economy. The neo-liberal views of the BWI's eventually became absorbed in the 
ANC leadership, although there has been a determination to give neo-liberalism 
the human face that South Africa's context requires (Michie and Padayachee, 
1997). In other words, neo-liberal practices have been espoused along with daily 
rhetoric continually involving the ultimate goals of alleviating poverty and 
narrowing inequality. The analysis of this case shall investigate the relevance and 
practicality of growth with equity in the developing context. 
Thirdly, Michie and Padayachee (1997) point out that in the time leading up to the 
elections of 1994, members of the tripartite alliance agreed to subsume their 
position to that of the ANC itself. The initiative was handed over and has yet to 
be retained. Much of the COSA TU leadership moved over to the ANC or the 
private sector, and therefore the organization would increasingly lose its 1980's 
momentum. 
Fourthly, South African white big business conglomerates used the time of the 
negotiations to effectively forge pacts and agreements with the ANC through 
behind the scenes planning sessions. This was a private campaign to introduce 
the former exile revolutionaries to the delicacies of capitalism and to emphasize 
their common destinies as South African elites. This future had to be clearly 











Africa was to attract foreign capital, a reality considered essential for a 
developing country's survival. 
Finally, Michie and Padayachee (1997) point to the make up of the GNU as the 
final factor that led to the entrenchment of orthodoxy reflected in economic 
policy. In the spirit of compromise and reconciliation, high profile economic 
portfolios were handed to NP cabinet ministers, along with the Governership of 
the Reserve Bank. 
The great resources of the private sector had successfully been utilized to 
influence the democratic movement on both the policy and ideological level. 
ANC leadership increasingly felt that their options were severely constrained in 
an era labeled 'The End of History', they believed they were indeed hearing the 
hard truths of a new developing economy dictated by neo-liberal globalization. 
The strong influence of the ANC's conservative elite was coming to the fore as 
the emphasis shifted onto the creation of a black middle class. This is bearing in 
mind that the organization was created to service the needs of disenfranchised 
black middle class lawyers in 1912. Marais argues in this vein that the party's 
working class links have always been sidelined and it is no surprise that when the 
crunch decisions had to be made such radical influences would continue to be 
excluded. Therefore, it has always been the ANC ideal to create a patriotic black 
capitalist class as a strategy to infiltrate the stranglehold of white domination in 
this sector, it was hoped that this could be reconciled with the gradual eradication 
of poverty through the narrowing of the gap of inequality. 
The ANC was left with very little 'room to maneuver' within the quagmire of 
economic bargaining that characterized the economic negotiations. The seeming 
conversion of Communists such as Erwin, Manuel and Mbeki himself, has been 
the result of the ANC reformulating its position in society from a liberation 
movement to a ruling party. Theirs is a view that as a developing nation the 











board. The tough choices had to be made and the costs of becoming a pariah 
nation yet again, were too high for a traumatized society to take on at that time. 
Sanctions had proven that economic survival was not possible in isolation, 
especially not as the world became increasingly integrated. The task was to 
utilize the global regime of neo-liberal economics to achieve the growth needed to 
uplift the poor and to allow the potential of South African business to finally 
flourish with the incorporation of a growing black middle class. South African 












THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH 
AFRICA 
(a) The Debate on Political and Economic Restructuring in South Africa 
The success of South Africa's transition in the 1990's was dependent upon the 
effective restructuring of the national economy. At a time of much political 
uncertainty it become vital for South Africa to effectively devise a plan that 
would facilitate a growing economy. Debates on economic restructuring and 
economic policy were therefore urgent and set the platform for the policies that 
would follow. It is the task of this section to follow these debates and to gain an 
understanding of the positions and contradictions of this challenge. The section 
shall examine the evolution of economic discussion of the ANC, Cosatu and the 
responses of big business, in order to identify fault lines and areas of 
convergence. Finally, the vigorous literature of academics at the time will also be 
examined in order to present the array of contesting perspectives which 
characterized this period. It is the objective to make sense of the debate and to 
trace the progression of economic thought which culminated in the policy 
documents of 1994 and 1996. 
Kentridge (1993) describes a time of much sophistication and dynamism in the 
realm of economic policy debate, "ideological labels have lost their purchase as 
apparently irreconcilable positions have seemed to converge" (1993; 1). The once 
perceived simplistic conflict between white capitalists and black socialists had 
become superceded by a necessary discussion concerning issues of economic 
restructuring, the relationship between growth and redistribution and a search for 
the right combination concerning the state and the market (Kentridge, 1993). 
Nattrass (1994) outlines that it was the task of those involved to "corne up with a 
consistent set of policies which promoted economic growth and job creation, 
alleviated white fears and boosted business confidence -- while at the same time 











trade union demands" (1994:346). This would prove a massive balancing act that 
gave rise to initial documents tending to be very broad statements of intent as 
opposed to an exact plan of action. In the spirit of the negotiated transition it was 
imperative to keep all the key players on board and to avoid the marginalization 
of specific interests from the grass roots to big business. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the ANC economic agenda prior to its 
unbanning in 1990, was always that of the broad ideals of the Freedom Charter. 
On his release in 1990 Mandela confirmed, "The nationalization of the mines, 
banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or 
modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable" (in Nattrass, 1994:344). 
Such assertions were the product of years of ANC struggle against apartheid and 
restated their historical ideals. Kentridge (1993) points out that as can be 
imagined in a time of such uncertainty, Mandela's statements were particularly 
concerning to the financial media and business. Such comments would introduce 
the economic debate and set out the direction and character of the years following 
up to the elections of 1994. 
Nattrass (1994) outlines that on the question of national economic restructuring 
the democratic movement could be divided into three camps. The first were the 
moderately inclined national leadership who were supported by ANC economic 
technocrats. This group accepted that the national movement would have to 
compromise on the question of economic policy. They were aware of the global 
economy and were registering international and domestic pressure to drop the 
nationalism slogan. They were attuned to the fact that their political survival 
depended on the success of a vibrant economy and were increasingly concerned 
about the reality of the macroeconomics of direct redistribution. This group 
would be championed by the ANC's Department of Economic Planning (DEP) 
under the leadership of Trevor Manuel and Tito Mboweni, who espoused a future 
national economy friendly to investors and guided towards the facilitation of 











The second group, were the grass roots activists, who viewed these changes in the 
leadership's thinking as particularly unfortunate. Theirs was a fundamental belief 
in the virtues of the Freedom Charter and that the ANC leadership was now 
courting with the enemy. Such activists believed the ANC should not break with 
their traditions and should continue in the cause of nationalism and redistribution. 
Such thinking would increasingly become frustrated with the direction that the 
leadership was taking on economic policy (Nattrass, 1994). 
The third group, were the trade unionists who would lead the call for 'Growth 
through Redistribution'. Like the grass roots activists they were also becoming 
frustrated at the leadership's increasing lack of consultation on economic issues. 
They were concerned about the future of labor in the ANC and would seek to 
oppose the leadership's movement towards business (Nattrass, 1994). 
By 1990 the calls from business and the financial media along with academics 
such as Peter Moll (1991) in The Great Economic Debate, resulted in the steady 
decline of nationalism from the economic agenda. In fact it became clear to 
commentators such as Moll that nationalism was an ideological call as opposed to 
a definite plan. The thinking in the ANC leadership would further assist the 
momentum away from the radical rhetoric of nationalistic ideals. 
The 1990 Discussion Document on Economic Policy (DDEP) did not refer to 
nationalism. The document desperately sought to forge unity between the alliance 
by presenting the paper as a progression of the Freedom Charter. The document 
called for the 'reconstruction' of the South African economy by labeling the 
project 'Growth through Redistribution'. Strong state intervention remained an 
important cornerstone of the hegemonic agenda to rectify the inequalities of 
apartheid. Privatization remained an evil considered unacceptable in an ANC 
economic plan. It was a national development strategy formulated by the ANC, 











the basis of the 1991 Draft Resolution on Economic Policy outlined at the ANC 
National Conference of that year (Kentridge, 1993). 
The 1990 Discussion document would firmly set the economic debate alight. It 
was the first in-depth ANC economic document and many analyzed it for insight 
into future economic policy trends. The document cemented common ties 
between business and the ANC on issues such as the need to overcome poverty 
and inequality, to address chronic unemployment and for blacks to be strategically 
empowered in the private sector (Kentridge, 1993). 
However, the document was widely criticized on certain theoretical levels by 
business and by economists within the movement. Sacob was particularly 
concerned with the documents heavy reliance on state intervention, a reluctance to 
connect wage increases with productivity and the direct rejection of privatization. 
Sacob was particularly concerned at the ANC's perceived role in the market 
pertaining to determining prices and the relaying of information to economic 
actors (Kentridge, 1993). 
ANC economists such as Moll (1991) in, Growth through Redistribution: A 
Dangerous Fantasy?, were also skeptical of the 'Growth though Redistribution' 
slogan. Moll (1991) states that whilst understanding the motivation and 
attractiveness for such a strategy, it would prove fundamentally irresponsible in 
the long run. He argues that the belief that large gains from redistribution are to 
come from the manipulation of the demand for goods and services at the macro-
level, is a fundamentally flawed one. Furthermore, he does not believe that the 
gains would be as large as the document predicts and that it is an incorrect 
assumption that massive welfare targets can be met all at once by increasing 
government spending and average wages (Moll, 1991). Moll believes that this 
reality is particularly tragic as the poor would be the worse off as inflation 
increases and as the economy becomes unsustainable. He posits that no 'income 











1990 Document believed. In sum, by failing to recogmze certain 'trade-offs' 
between desired goals, Moll (1991) argued that the movement ran the danger of 
creating unattainable expectations, receiving reduced political support and 
ultimately failing the poor. Gelb writes in 1991 that it was the challenge of ANC 
practitioners to drop 'utopian fantasies' and that their was a need for, 
"engagement with capitalism, the object being to intervene and shape a capitalist 
order which is both more humane and more dynamic than has been true of South 
African capitalism in the past... by enabling the working classes to become 
considerably better off, economically and politically, than they have been" (Gelb 
in WIP, 1991:43). 
Ultimately, the ANC National Conference did not pass the policy document in 
July of 1991. Such theoretical criticism by progressive economists and due to 
pressure from business interest groups, the movement began to re-examine the 
question of growth and redistribution. Importantly, as Kentridge (1993) points 
out, future ANC economic policy proposals would not put redistribution first and 
growth as an after thought. The DEP would change its policy direction to 
facilitate both towards a 'Growth with Equity' strategy. This was reflected in a set 
of policy proposals in 1992 called Ready to Govern, although seeking to find 
continuity with the 1990 document, this new policy path sought a new direction 
for the movement. The private sector was now seen as an essential partner, 
privatization was for the first time introduced and the state was now increasingly 
being viewed as a facilitator and not a provider. The DEP was determined to set 
up a clear development path for the ANC leading up to the considered eminent 
acceptance of power. 
ANC economIC thinking was by no means uniform on the nature of future 
economic policy and the subsequent focus of economic thinking. As mentioned 
in the previous section, another economic think-tank called Merg, set up a report 
entitled, Making Democracy Work: A Framework Jor jt1acroeconomic policy in 











that South Africa had a unique 'opportunity for change'. The proposal built on 
the foundations of the 1992 Cosatu Conference on economic restructuring. The 
four pillars of the Cosatu position were: job creation, human resource 
development with an emphasis on skills development, a social wage and increased 
delivery of social services and security provisions, and the empowerment of civil 
society groups particularly workers, women and the rural (Merg, ] 993). 
Essentially the Cosatu position was characterized by the need to increase the 
capacity of worker power. In conjunction the trade union sought a strong, 
decisive and democratic state, which campaigned for growth and which supported 
economic reconstruction (Merg, 1993). 
The Merg policy argued that the central goals of the ANC at the time was to 
eliminate poverty and inequality as a consequence of apartheid, to democratize 
the economy by empowering the oppressed, to ensure productive employment 
opportunities and a living wage, to initiate a growth and development strategy to 
increase the quality of life of all South African particularly the poor, and to 
maintain a prosperous and balanced regional economy (Merg, 1993). 
Merg economists took these goals as there starting point and sought an economy 
in line with the Keynesian or mixed economy approach. Essentially they wanted 
the direct and strategic attention of the national economy to be focused on the 
poor and marginalized. The program criticized other perspectives as being too 
pro-rich and strongly opposed their 'trickle down' connotation. The policy agreed 
for the need for sustained growth and macroeconomic balance, for prudent and 
risk averse fiscal monetary and balance of payment management and for the 
participation in free global markets. But differed with the DEP in the role of the 
state in the development process particularly on the issue of social service 
proVISIOn. 
The varying economic policy positions of Merg, the DEP and Cosatu within the 











of ANC economic policy leading up to the elections. The political and economic 
intellectual debate is particularly salient in presenting the different perspectives of 
the time. 
Nattrass (1994) in, Economic Restructuring in South Africa: The Debate 
Continues, gave a critique of the strong interventionist strategies of the likes of 
Merg. She particularly investigated contentious issues such as the debate on 
higher wages, intervention in the capital market and the degree of importance 
attributed to business confidence. 
N attrass (1994) argued that the post-1990 debate on economIC restructuring 
needed to move past the old simplistic liberal versus radical debate and to instead 
focus more on the fluidity and pragmatism that was needed by the democratic 
movement to foster a successful policy agenda. She outlines that the ANC had 
correctly progressed from the redistribution and strong state perspective as a 
means for attaining growth of the early 1990's, to a more business friendly 
position with an emphasis on increased fiscal discipline as a means to sustainable 
redistribution. On the question of more or less state intervention, she seeks a 
meritocratic and efficient state with strong and vibrant ties to the private sector 
(Nattrass, 1994). 
Her criticism of Merg was that the developmental-state operated project which 
they espoused, had become outdated by the 1990' s. Due to certain changes in the 
global economy, capital's influence had increased and its scope had become a lot 
more fluid. Capital was crossing borders quicker than the state could manage. As 
sustainable investment became paramount for national economies worldwide, 
increased investment opportunities for capital made the creation of the correct 
policy environment crucial. In sum, Nattrass (1994) argued that the result was a 
decrease in government bargaining power at the national level and that the state 












Moll (1991) conquers that the state must react responsibly in the light of the 
increasing importance of investment and growth. He posits that the state should 
avoid sudden rises in government spending and wage earnings in order to foster 
an environment of stability. Moll argues for the importance of reorganizing the 
supply side of the economy in order to encourage growth. Only this would yield 
sufficient returns from the demand side for effective restructuring. The point 
made by both Moll (1991) and Nattrass (1994) was that any country in the post 
Cold War period could not survive if there was a drastic capital flight out of the 
economy, and that such a reality would be disastrous for any attempts to uplift the 
poor. In this light it is therefore imperative for national economic policy to 
prioritize an agenda with regards to international and domestic capital, and in so 
doing to focus less on direct state intervention and redistribution. 
In defense of the Merg position, John Sender (1994) in Economic Restructuring in 
South Africa: Reactionary Rhetoric Prevail.';, countered the belief that Merg had 
ignored the role of business interests. He claims that the lack of private sector 
investment in the national economy was central to the Merg analysis. He believed 
that such a critique oversimplified the reactionary rhetoric. Essentially Sender 
(1994) questions the link between less state intervention, risking business 
confidence and increasing investment This approach seeks to contextualize the 
South African and the Third World experience for an argument in favor of a 
strong and responsible state. Sender (1994) takes issue with a blanket portrayal of 
the state as a 'corrupt', 'arrogant' and 'rent seeking' entity. He believes such a 
deduction ignores political struggle, ideological campaigning and conscious 
institutional campaigning. Sender posits that Merg argued for the need to modify 
and invent the institutions crucial for capitalist industrialization, with an effective 












Raphael Kaplinsky (1994) of the Industrial Strategy Project writing on the same 
debate asserts that a fall in wages, a maintenance of corporate power and a weak 
state which is unable to correct market failure, is unacceptable for the post-
apartheid economy. Kaplinsky (1994) maintains that the above position is 
unsustainable and pays little attention to the problems facing the South African 
economy. He points particularly to areas pertaining to the need to address South 
Africa's reliance on the mineral and energy complex, of the need to engender the 
changes in work-organization and inter-firm linkages in global industry, and of 
the imperatives in promoting black entrepreneurship. 
He outlines the ISP position on the debate to firstly seek an industrial 
restructuring which is not only sustainable but that is politically feasible. He 
envisages a positive role for the state in this regard. And secondly, to 
fundamentally address the inadequacies of the South African state by engaging in 
a pro-active path with regards the developmental debate (Kaplinsky, 1994). 
Finally, Fine (1994) argues that the standard debate on economic restructuring 
had ignored the South African political history. He expresses that economists had 
overlooked the heritage of the economic and political realities of the South 
African experience. He questions the prioritization of business in this context as 
an underestimation of the state in the state and market debate. In that as the state 
needs business for investment, so does business need the state for political and 
social stability. He makes the point that, "to appeal to the need for business 
confidence is to apologize for the ANC having come to power" (1994:20). Fine 
(1994) believed in a need for policy analysts to understand the context in which 
ANC economic documents were devised in the 1990's. He warns against an 
oversimplification of the relationship between the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP 
when relating economic issues. Although the alliance remained united in their 
historical goals of non-racism and the armed struggle, the 1990's economic debate 
was characterized by contradictions and convergence. Therefore, any debate on 











this regard Fine (1994) explains, "the 1990's have witnessed a shift in the locus of 
decision making to a high level in the ANC leadership and negotiating team. 
Lower level activity has been subdued and displaced" (1994:24). 
This section has sought to follow the debate on national economic restmcturing 
which characterized the period from the unbanning of the ANC until the 1994 
elections. This has been to gain a greater understanding of the influences that 
have shaped the movements economic thought and eventual policy. What is clear 
is that the ANC had experienced fundamental shifts in economic thinking during 
this period. The movement seemed to adopt a pragmatic approach which sought 
to engage a wide array of interests as possible. As Kentridge (1993) highlights, it 
was unclear whether this pragmatism was through political necessity or due to a 
genuine change in economic direction. ANC policy makers had to find a balance 
between the neo-classical influences of the Bretton Woods Institution's, the 
Keynesian developmental-state approach favored by ANC economists and could 
not ignore their loyal grass roots support who had a strong distmst of capitalism 
as a result of apartheid and the failings of stmctural adjustment programs on the 
rest of the continent. From this debate it becomes clear that the politics of 
economic restmcturing was one of compromise and contradiction. Past 
ideological stand-offs needed to be replaced to insure a broad coalition and to 
foster a legitimacy of institutions. Once this would be achieved the ANC 
leadership would increasingly take the lead in the economic debate and shift 
policy in line with the growth orientated thesis. 
Bearing this debate in mind it is important that we take a look at the economic 
policies that have resulted. As touched on thus far, economic policy in 
democratic South Africa has been characterized by the RDP (1994-1996) and 
GEAR (1996-). Conventional analysis of the two economic policies have 











The first of these interpretations VIews the RDP and GEAR as two discrete 
policies, occupying opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. Thus the RDP 
embodies what might be called a more socialist approach to macroeconomIC 
policy-making, as opposed to GEAR's neo-liberal approach. In June of 1996 the 
ANC government replaced the RDP with GEAR under relatively discreet 
conditions. Such an approach would view the move as the formerly socialist-
orientated ANC betraying its constituency in favor of an emerging bourgeois 
agenda. 
A second interpretation, one often advanced by government, is that GEAR is an 
extension of the progress made by the RDP. As such it offers technical guidelines 
that elucidate how the 'economic' components of the RDP vision are to be 
achieved. Therefore it is the plan to achieve the goals laid out in the RDP. The 
GEAR policy, being a macroeconomic policy, is moreover suitably silent about 
the 'social' aspects of the RDP, which fall outside its domain. However, in getting 
the macroeconomic fundamentals right, GEAR does the groundwork in preparing 
a suitable context for the delivery of these social goods. 
A third interpretation is that GEAR is a response to a range of constraints 
functioning at the domestic and international levels. Most prominently, at the 
domestic level such constraints include the demands of South African big 
business, while at the international level the realities of economic globalization 
coupled with the apparent triumph of neo-liberalism over alternative ideologies 
has meant that the only paradigm in which macroeconomic policy may 
legitimately operate is a neo-liberal one. This views the developing economy as 
being firmly in the straightjacket of the global market. 
The third interpretation fits into the argument of this research. The RDP was a 
result of a wide-ranging consensus that reflected the ideals and concerns of the 
time of the transition. It was a document that sought to unite South Africa in a 











problems that face the new nation. It largely fulfilled the purpose of being a solid 
foundation document for an uncertain election period, a document which sought 
to incorporate all was a result of acute calculated guesses. This was at a time 
when globalization had not reached its peak. 
This research argues that GEAR is the physical plan to achieve the goals laid out 
in the RDP. The RDP served the purpose of the time as a moral piece that 
identified the stark problems facing the new nation. Where RDP was vague, 
GEAR set out a definite set of macroeconomic principles that intended to put 
South Africa on a steady growth strategy. GEAR was a result of years of 
negotiations and was the place where technocrats wanted South Africa to be from 
the beginning of the negotiation process. Therefore, RDP and GEAR do not 
represent different ideological standpoints, but the evolution of economic practice 
in a young democracy. An ideologically unbiased pragmatism has become a 
hegemonic project of the ANC administration and has largely dictated the public 
sphere. South Africa has taken on the moderate economic agenda in order to 
cater for the unique cultural, economic, social and political practices of the 
African setting. GEAR 'speak' has come to reflect the reality that was sketched 
out during the negotiations. One such strategy has been the BEE project, which 
has sought to utilize the neo-liberal agenda in order to empower a growing black 
middle class as a means to narrow South Africa's notorious inequality. Such a 
strategy has the intention of creating an ANC loyal private sector as a response to 
the traditional lethargy and unpatriotic attitude of white big business. Such an 
approach prioritizes the consolidation of a black capitalist class as opposed the 
fundamental eradication of poverty. 
(b) The RDP years 
Lester, Nel and Binns (2000) label the RDP as a set of moral regeneration 
principles as opposed an economic policy. The program provided an 
identification of the new South Africa's inherited structural problems as a legacy 











document that served as a cornerstone policy for the new ANC government. The 
policy did well to thoroughly analyze the context that the new administration was 
inheriting. To map out a set of goals that the new government ought to attain to 
cleanse the country of the structural imbalances that had accumulated since the 
beginning of the colonial project in South Africa. In other words, the RDP would 
prove a source of self-evaluation for the ANC and its objectives as a ruling party. 
The policy was a broad consensus and set of compromises of divergent interests 
and did well as a unifying and reconciling force. The politically neutral policy 
steered clear of making contentious macroeconomic decisions but instead settled 
on broad ideals in the Keynesian mould. The program was claimed as a victory 
for all interests groups. As University of the Witwatersrand professor Tom Lodge 
points out in his work, South African Politics since 1994, the policy meant 
different things to different people. For the group clustered as the broad 'left', 
such as ANC allies the SACP and COSATU, the RDP was hailed as a decisive 
break from western conventional economics. At the SACP 9th Congress in 1995, 
the organization's leadership proclaimed a victory for the poor of South Africa. 
Their vision of the program included basic tenants such as redistribution, 
reconstruction through inward focused development, a leading role for the state 
apparatus, and the priority of the process being essentially people driven. It was 
viewed victoriously that the disenfranchised had finally become the priority of a 
South African government. Such views would become increasingly sidelined 
over time, as the people centered ideals of the 'left' would suffer complete 
disillusionment by 1996. This was as their mainstream ally would take the 'short 
walk to orthodoxy' and replace redistribution for growth, therefore, shifting the 
focus off of the poor onto a growing black elite (Lodge, 1999). 
The new ANC-Ied GNU took a less populist view of the new RDP as they tried to 
juggle the ideals of the struggle with a commitment to the market signaled by the 
endorsement of privatization and the down-sizing of the public sector. As 











were simplified as 'jobs, water, houses, peace and land'. Having such broad ideals 
and a widespread purpose, would eventually make the RDP impotent and force 
the government into a more aggressive stance. 
For the conservatives such as business, the RDP signaled a victory of their 
consultation efforts since 1990. They tended to focus on the foundation policy's 
commitment to: development through a partnership between the state and the 
private sector, the downsizing of the state, international competitiveness and an 
educated and productive work force (Lodge, 1999). 
The eventual RDP White paper in September of 1994 began to illustrate the 
departure from the ethos of the original RDP document agreed upon by the ANC 
and COSATU, as government technocrats found it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile the Keynesian and neo-liberal agenda. This would signal a progression 
that would result in the neo-liberal GEAR policy of 1996. 
In the words of the ANC publication, 'RDP Challenges I, "The RDP is an 
integrated program, based on the people, that will provide peace and security for 
all and build a nation. It links reconstruction and development and deepens 
democracy" (ANC, 1994:2). Such was the rhetoric of the RDP years, a 
reconciliatory tone that sought to incorporate market principles with a social 
responsibility. One of the strengths of the program was to identify the widespread 
challenges facing the new era. The RDP prioritized ten fundamental challenges. 
-To shift expenditure patterns to meet new priorities, 
-T 0 implement new inter-governmental fiscal relations, 
-To restructure and transfonn state and parastatal institutions, 
-To restructure the civil service, 
-To maintain a culture of fiscal discipline by containing government consumption 
and by reducing foreign debt, 











-To harbor a partnership between major players such as government, business and 
trade unions, 
-To create an environment of stability by restoring law and order as a strategy for 
investment, 
-To create a democratic local government structure to deliver on RDP principles, 
-And to make society responsible for development (ANC, 1994:2). 
As can be seen these were very broad challenges of principle and served as the 
foundation for future macro-economic reform. The ANC viewed the project as 
building on the ideals of the Freedom Charter that would eventually lead the 
economy on a path of sustainable development to eradicate the twin evils of 
poverty and inequality. 
The six basic principles of the program were a deliberate reflection of widespread 
consultation and debate. The ANC made it a point of the reconciliatory period to 
incorporate all sectors of society and to not take on a triumphant stance. This is 
well reflected in the creation of economic policy since the negotiations. The basic 
principles of the RDP were: an integrated and sustainable program, a people 
driven process, peace and security for all, nation building, the linkage of 
reconstruction, development and growth, and the entrenchment of a democratic 
ethos in South Africa (ANC, 1994:4). 
The priority was on the upliftment of the poor, rural and female, whom through a 
bottom up approach, were identified as the greatest victims of economic 
segregation and in need of a structural boost. As a liberation movement, it was 
important for the new ruling bloc to publicly and officially represent those, whom 
the system they had fought against, had made the most desperate and 
marginalized. The policy therefore, warns against trickle-down development and 
outright growth strategies, as not prioritizing the improvement of the quality of 
those in desperate need. The policy envisaged a combination of democracy, 











combination of both commandist and liberal practice. This was expressed in the 
ANC position at the time, " One of our basic principles ... was that of linking 
reconstruction and development. This is in contrast to the argument that growth is 
needed before development is possible, an approach which would leave intact the 
severe regional, racial and gender and structural imbalances that characterize the 
present economy" (ANC, 1994:82). This was thought to only be achieved 
through, "the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and 
active involvement by all sections of civil society which in combination will lead 
sustainable growth" (1994:79). 
Such principles were sufficiently idealistic and politically neutral not to be 
opposed. These ideals would serve to entrench governmental rhetoric that 
remains to this day. The RDP served its purpose for the time period that 
characterized the transition. All however knew, that the battle would resume 
when hard decisions needed to be made as to how exactly these basic tenants of a 
free democracy, would best be achieved. 
The program was headed by Jay Naidoo as a unique office in the presidency. The 
office channeled money into various projects with mixed success. The program 
was plagued by delivery inefficiency from its inception. Lester, Nel and Binns 
(2000) claim that this was as a result of the office lacking clarity as to its role and 
function and as the office was void of top ranking ANC officials. As a result, 
from the $2.5 billion allocated to program, only roughly $1 billion was ever spent. 
In the years following the 1994 elections, the office would receive much criticism 
from all quarters, because of the seeming lack of clarity with regards macro-
economic fundamentals. 
Key problems began to arise when structured plans were formulated to satisfy 
principled objectives. For example, as globalization expanded in influence it 
would become increasingly difficult to use words such as reconstruction, 











which of these three would become priority number one. The RDP tended to take 
an active role in the achievement of equity by warning against the trickle down 
approach to development. Others, whose voices were becoming more prominent 
by the day, were arguing in favor of a definite growth strategy as a precursor to 
reconstruction. Conflicting opinions would arise with regards the role of the state 
in this process. In other words, to what degree the responsibility rested with the 
state to rectify centuries of socio-economic destruction. Many within the ANC 
up-coming elite believed that the route of labor would result in South Africa 
incurring the wrath of international markets that would be to the detriment of 
economic growth. It was widely felt amongst such ANC elites that following the 
end of the Mandela euphoria, South Africa would lose its most 'favored nation 
status' and become just another developing economy. This line of thinking in the 
ANC would take government policy into the realm of capital, as think: tanks 
would seek to keep spending on education, health and housing in real terms. It 
was over these issues that the RDP would eventually be disbanded. 
As economically conservative deputy-president Thabo Mbeki would increase in 
prominence and take over the reins of day-to-day administration from Mandela, 
the RDP would eventually be fazed out. Jay Naidoo and his office would exit the 
office of the presidency, as Mbeki would usher in a new generation embracing the 
'no alternative approach'. It has been noted that Mbeki and Naidoo would often 
clash at cabinet meetings. The paramount role of Mbeki in South African 
economic policy is investigated in the next chapter. Although the RDP ideals and 
objectives remain, the program became largely seen as a socio-economic 
experiment at a time of much uncertainty. It was clear that there were many 
influences over South Africa's solution but that the RDP did well in achieving a 
sense of stability at a time when the country could have gone either way. The 
new breed of ANC technocrats such as Mbeki, Manuel and Erwin would seek to 











(c) GEAR: 'Macroeconomic Discipline' 
The implementation of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
economic strategy in June of 1996 signaled the culmination of economic thought 
in the ANC since the beginning of the negotiations for the new South Africa. The 
policy and its execution has come to symbolize the ambiguous vision that 
juggling many constraints dictates. The 'run away train' perception of 
globalization and the corporatist solution of the transition are reflected directly in 
GEAR. The ambiguity resides in the policy being sold as a community based 
proponent of the poor. The primary objective of the transitionary period was to 
entrench a foundation of political stability. By 1996, the ANC's dominance had 
allowed for this reality. It was now the task of the ruling party to build on this 
political stability by putting in place the fundamentals to attain growth. To this 
end, the fonner revolutionary organization had to prove to the domestic private 
sector and global investors, that South Africa was committed to political 
democracy and economic liberalization. 
(c.1) Post-liberation political economy and the end of 'two stage theory' 
As mentioned, ANC economic thought before the negotiations revolved around 
the nationalistic ideals of the Charterist movement emanating from the 1950s in 
the heyday of Ghanaian independence. Marais (1998) outlines that like many 
liberation movements, the ANC traditionally assumed the notions of the 'two 
stage theory' as a response to colonial domination. This assumed that the first 
step of liberation was to seize the concentrated power of the state apparatus, and 
that this would allow for the second phase of implementing far-reaching social 
and economic refonn. This is a belief in the need for the eradication of the racist 
institutions and practices of the colonial state in order to replace it with a new 
pure one. Therefore, the fixation would be upon comprehensive seizure of the 
state apparatus. This fonned the basis of revolutionary politics that reached a 
peak towards the end of the Cold War. However, as has been the focus of this 











Unlike in the time of colonialization, the state is no longer an autonomous entity. 
Globalization has meant that a sovereign state is under the constant control of 
domestic and foreign capital. Mandela relays that an integrated global economy, 
"made it impossible ... [to] decide national economic policy without the regard for 
the likely response of the markets" (Marais, 1998: 161). As investigated in the 
previous chapter, the combined forces of domestic business and the global 
economy, made the ANC firmly constrained within the 'straightjacket' of market 
led principles. The struggle had allowed for the restructuring of the political 
sphere but the economic sphere remained (and continues to remain) out of their 
control. 
(c.2) The formation of GEAR 
GEAR was South Africa's first practical macro-economic strategy that sought to 
firmly establish the new nation's economic fundamentals. The orthodox policy 
was the result of consultation amongst the Reserve Bank, the Southern African 
Development Bank, the World Bank and economic theorists from Stellenbosch 
University (Bond, 2000). The program was devised in 'somewhat secretive 
conditions' and was released after briefings with top ANC, SACP and COSA TU 
leadership. In fact, the majority of ANC MPs only became aware of the program 
as it was nearly complete. In this vein, current Minister of Finance Trevor 
Manuel (one of GEAR's chief architects) has continually told critics that the 
fundamentals of the policy are unegotiable although willing to encourage 
discussion regarding the details (Marais, 200 I). This corporatist hegemonic 
project was the direct result of the 'coerced harmony' signed amongst elites from 
both sides during scenario planning sessions during the negotiations. 
GEAR reflected the 'short walk to orthodoxy' as the ANC evolution of economic 
thought had committed South Africa to the internationally accepted principles of 
neo-liberal economic management. The ANC had corne to power late enough to 
witness the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of one 











the 1990s economic isolation was not an option and that South Africa necded a 
practical response to the ruthless nature of the global economy that dismisses and 
marginalizes those who negate the market in favor of revolutionary social reform 
(Lester, Nel and Binns, 2000:253). 
As Manuel, Mboweni and Erwin came into prominence by 1993 the evolution to 
GEAR was set in motion as the ANC firmly rejected the Keynesian analysis of 
Merg. The letter of intent that accompanied the 1993 IMF/World Bank loan 
illustrated further the intention of the new government. The RDP did well to lay 
out South Africa's structural problems and the goals that the administration should 
seek to achieve. However, by the end of 1995 the humanitarian program was 
deemed too state orientated and not adept to deal with decreasing growth rates, 
slow delivery and fluctuating investor confidence. Some tough choices had to be 
made on the foundation of the political stability that was provided by the RDP and 
the transitional period. What South Africa desperately needed was a prolonged 
period of sustained growth to deal with poverty and unemployment, a consistent 
and cohesive GEAR was considered the answer to this call (Lester, Nel, and 
Binns, 2000). 
(c.3) The establishment of economic fundamentals 
Stephan Gelb in his work, 'The Politics of Macroeconomic reform in South 
Africa', states that macroeconomic intervention was needed to accelerate the 
process of microeconomic reforms of infrastructure development. As a start, 
GEAR practitioners decided an exchange rate devaluation was necessary as 
standard operating procedure. This devaluation proved unnecessary as the Rand 
was found to be overvalued. Gelb points out that policy focus shifted to restoring 
investor credibility. GEAR placed South Africa into an outward orientated 
strategy that relied on steady influxes of foreign and domestic investment. As an 
outgrowth of political stability, Gelb highlights that GEAR sought as its primary 
objective to make South Africa investor friendly. This was a long term and non-











political dominance. Sustained growth could never be achieved without a 
constant flow of investment into the developing economy. As such the idea of 
intervention was abandoned and essentially the aim was to publish a document 
that reaffirmed the commitment to macroeconomic austerity. GEAR aimed to 
reaffirm the government's commitment to international competitiveness. The 
immediate aim was to show investors that the ANC was committed to orthodox 
economics whilst at the same time the policy was sold as home-grown (Gelb, 
1999). 
Many have described the policy as floughting between two-world's with regards 
its ideals. The government publication, GEAR (1996), highlighted the intention 
to achieve high growth rates, expand the private sector, to improve output and 
employment, to achieve fiscal reform and to encourage trade and investment. On 
the other hand, this was hoped to service the country's social crisis. Thus the 
policy sought eventual redistribution, service delivery and job creation. The 
ideology followed the assumption that sustained growth should be attained as a 
primary objective and that this would lead to the eradication of poverty and 
unemployment. Such a position adheres to a positive linkage between growth and 
equity. The RDP objectives remained but the state took on a more facilitatory 
role in favor of the private sector. The plan therefore included: the reduction of 
state spending, the strict control of the budget deficit, the reduction of corporate 
taxation and foreign exchange rate controls, firm control on inflation, increased 
privatization, and the encouragement of wage restraint (GEAR, 1996). This was 
all the while packaged in a homegrown rhetoric of redistribution fighting poverty 
and inequality. Bond (2000) describes this hegemonic initiative as 'talking left 
while acting right.' 
Nattrass in an article entitled, 'Gambling on investment: Competing economic 
strategies in South Africa', contends that this neo-classical growth strategy 
typically viewed the state as having to be both small and strong. She explains that 











health crisis, a chronically unequal education system, and to not be overawed by 
sectional interests, Whilst also being small enough to maintain efficiency and 
encourage investment 
GEAR's projections were markedly optimistic. The program envisaged growth 
increases culminating in a 6 per cent high by year 2000. On a practical level this 
would mean the creation of 400 000 jobs per annum on the back of 8 per cent 
boosts in exports per annum. Therefore, GEAR projected the creation of I, 35 
million jobs between 1996-2000, As a result of growth such job creation was 
deemed to benefit South Africa's socio-economic crisis. The focus on private 
investment and non-gold exports (especially the manufacturing sector) was hoped 
to be combined with increases in social spending on social infrastructure (Marais, 
2001). In sum, the long-term project of GEAR had three objectives: growth, job 
creation, and socio-economic equity. 
(cA) Initial results 
It becomes obvious then that GEAR has not achieved many of its long-term goals. 
By 1999 growth was hovering at the unacceptably low rate of 1, 2 percent which 
was up from a disappointing 0,5 percent in 1998. The building of a reputation 
that convinces investors has proven a painfully slow and complex process. 
Marais (2001) points out that the policy was criticized for its naivete regarding the 
attraction of investment The policy has been critiqued as being based on a 'leap 
of faith'. The international goodwill shown towards South Africa following the 
end of Apartheid has not led to the anticipated FDL GEAR has been exposed to 
the fickle nature of investors as South Africa has struggled to shake negatively 
entrenched perceptions of the country and the continent on which it resides. 
Despite extensive privatization of state parastatalls in the fields of 
telecommunications, minerals, energy, agriculture, forestry, leisure and transport, 
for the purpose of attracting investment and for increased efficiency, 1998 FDI 











South Africa would soon discover that the 40 percent increase in global flows of 
FDI in the late 1990s was mainly for established industrialized countries. 
Domestically, there were no measures put in place that ensured the private sector 
stuck to their responsibility to lead the economy. Despite the offering of tax 
breaks to ensure business investment, the white dominated sector has not taken up 
the call for a renewed patriotism and have tended to prove lethargic on the whole. 
Off shore investments have proven more lucrative to major South African 
business. This was signaled by major domestic conglomerates such as Anglo-
American and South African Breweries (SAB) moving their primary listings to 
the London Stock Exchange. 
The proposed partnership between the private and public sector has proven 
troublesome, as the open nature of the economy has in fact resulted in greater 
capital flight out of the country. This vulnerability to capital flight and global 
market fluctuations has made delivery slow in areas such as education, health, 
housing and land reform. The money that entered and exited South Africa as a 
result of the macroeconomic stance, has largely been 'hot money' that has proven 
erratic and prone to perception. This inconsistency has made delivery 
exceptionally ditlkult (Bond, 2000). 
Perhaps the biggest disappointment with the performance of GEAR thus far has 
been its inability to create jobs. Bearing in mind that the policy is long term, the 
performance thus far has been characterized by the phenomena of what 
economists have called Jobless growth'. Lester, Nel and Binns (2000) describe 
the disappointing statistics that by 1999 the economy had shed about 500 000 jobs 
since 1994. And importantly, 350 000 of these were since the implementation of 
GEAR in 1996. The small and medium business enterprises have been the focus 
of recent Budget speeches and parliamentary deliberation, as the source of major 
job creation in South Africa. Mbeki has said, "Throughout the world, the small-
enterprise sector is playing a critical role in absorbing labor, penetrating new 











2000:96). In this vein the 200011 Budget speech boasted large tax cuts for small 
business. This was compounded in president Mbeki's February 2002 State of the 
Nation Address, where he called economic transformation a national effort. 
Through his plead for 'Vuk' uzenzele' or lend a hand, Mbeki highlighted the point 
that government policy needs to be accompanied by communities getting involved 
in their own economic initiative to contribute to the national good. Jobless 
growth from 1994-1999 clearly hit home the realization that growth does not 
immediately result in employment, this was made difficult as a more directive 
approach would discredit the chosen macroeconomic fundamentals. South Africa 
therefore, needed to come up with innovative ways to create jobs. 
(c.5) Government's defense of GEAR 
Marais (2001) points to three areas where the government has focused its defense 
of GEAR. Politically, the policy has been portrayed as an elaboration of the 
principles of the RDP and therefore illustrates consistency in objectives since 
coming into power. Therefore, the program is viewed as the next step from the 
foundation of the political settlement. 
Economically, the policy has been hailed for its commitment to macroeconomic 
fundamentals that have provided for sustained growth and a competitive private 
sector. Nattrass reviews these as, "a set of orthodox, outward-orientated, investor-
friendly stabilization and adjustment policies; make the labor market more 
flexible, cut government consumption spending, and boast investment by the 
government and the parastatals" (1996:29). Furthermore, the reduction of 
government deficit in line with increased output would result in growth and the 
eventual comprehensive eradication of poverty and hunger. Such principles are 
described by Manual as fundamentals from which South Africa must not yield. 
Finally, the ANC has continually defended the claim that 'sound fundamentals' 
have come at the expense of social service delivery. Despite budget cuts they 











1999/2000. The finance ministry has maintained that continued GDP growth and 
success in tax collection would continue to witness increasing funds made 
available for land redistribution and reform (Marais, 2001). Mbeki has made the 
claim that no where around the globe after a negotiated settlement from a 'state of 
emergency' to democracy, has such sustained delivery been achieved. 
(d) Conclusion 
South Africa has not been treated as an African exception as was anticipated, and 
has been exposed to the troubles of all integrated developing economies pegged to 
the global economy. Thus, South Africa has increasingly become vulnerable to 
outside forces and global fluctuations. The national currency was particularly 
hard hit by the crash of the Asian Tiger's towards the end of the twentieth century, 
and the September II th attacks in 2001. Although recovering to the best 
performing currency against the dollar in the year 2002, the Rand took a major 
crash at the end of 2001. Continued lack of confidence in African economic 
recovery and stability, along with global insecurity, has made neo-liberal success 
particularly difficult for vulnerable developing economies. South Africa has not 
been exempt from the global dominance of capital that tends to prefer the safe 
havens of the 'Triad'. 
Lester, Nel and Binns (2000) make the following observations about South Africa 
governmental policy and its position in global reality. "When it left apartheid 
behind, South Africa did not leave behind the structures and processes which 
generate inequality. It did not enter some 'neutral' post-modem, post-industrial 
and post-apartheid arena in which it could transcend inherited inequalities and 
construct a totally revised political discourse and economic structure. Rather, it 
remains inescapably embedded within a globalized, Western-dominated, capitalist 
system, which continues actively to produce inequalities" (2000:322). 
Structural inequality remains in South Africa and is widening as the 'trickle down' 











of developing economIes have largely rendered the ANC unable to 
comprehensively alter this status quo. The political miracle was tough enough but 
the 'long walk' to economic liberation seems to be tougher yet. Of late investment 
has improved as South Africa has been relatively stable in global terms. The 
ANC's non-populist GEAR has began to reap rewards in this area. Gold prices 
have been steadily improving and South Africa has become the hottest tourist 
destination since the September 11 th attacks in the US. However, a national 
development project in an interconnected global economy perpetuating inequality, 
has proven tough. This is especially true when one brings into account the health 
crisis that is HIV/AIDS and the massive levels of unemployment that remains 
unabated. 
Perhaps the biggest reality that has corne out of GEAR has been the ideological 
authority that the program represents. As mentioned at the beginning, GEAR was 
a direct consequence of a coerced harmony that evolved out of the scenario 
planning sessions during the negotiations and very definite interpretations of 
globalization. This corporatist result has forged relationships between former 
enemies, which have maintained the elite nature of South Africa economic policy 
with regards who benefits and who losses out. Morris (1993) warns that, 
"Powerful forces are leading us towards a new two nation society, a 50% solution 
that will allow some South African's to embrace opportunity and privilege, but 
banish the rest to the margins" (1993:7). Although remotely changing in nature, 
the 'two-nation' system remains. Black, rural and female remain poor and 
marginalized. The top tier remains urban and white, although a growing black 
middle class have been the biggest beneficiaries of GEAR and have joined in the 












Thabo Mbeki and Black Economic Empowerment 
" ... An important element of the tasks of the state is ensuring that the glass ceiling 
of apartheid is removed from above the aspirations and ambitions of the black 
middle strata and capitalist class. In a systematic way, the [National Democratic 
Revolution] has come to ensure that ownership of private capital... is not defined 
in racial terms. Thus the new state - in its procurement policy, its program of 
restructuring state assets, utilization of instruments and empowerment, pressure 
and other measures - promotes the emergence of a black capitalist class. Yet if 
this were to be an end in itself it would be a sure way to abort the NDR. While 
these forces are direct beneficiaries of the NDR and share an interest in its 
advancement in the current phase, they can easily be co-opted into agendas of 
their white counterparts; and they can easily also become a source of corruption 
within the state, ANC leadership of these forces is therefore crucial" (Mbeki in 
Corrigan, 1999: 67). 
(a) The Mbeki administration 
The advent of conservative macroeconomic principles in the ANC has culminated 
with the rise of Thabo Mbeki to prominence during the Mandela presidency. 
Although GEAR was written up by economists and the elite in the Ministry of 
Finance, it is well known that drafts continually needed to be passed by the office 
of the deputy-president. Lodge (1999) writes that Mbeki was in close discussion 
with GEAR technocrats long before the policy was shown to the ANC executive, 
and even Mandela himself. Furthermore, Lodge continues that although Erwin 
and Manuel have become the outward face of GEAR since its inception, Mbeki 
has largely been its driving force. 
The policy characterizes his general non-popUlist stance, and its component of 
BEE, reflects his emphasis on the need for the prosperity of the private sector and 











due to his close engagement with global politics and economic trends, that the 
revolutionary ideals of direct redistribution and nationalization where not possible 
in a developing economy in the 1990s. He identified that the only way to address 
inequality was to use the capitalist approach to enrich black South Africans, and 
in so doing, create a South African prosperity that was not based on racial or 
ethnic politics. The GEAR hegemonic project is a dream of Mbeki and is the 
foundation of his presidency. It would be a dream that he had not only for his 
own country, but also for the continent as a whole. An Africa led by market 
principles with South Africa at the forefront (Mbeki, 1998). South African 
economIC policy reflects Mbeki's interpretation of globalization. An ANC 
engaged with market principles whilst championing the poor community reflects 
his adherence to pragmatism. He refuses to prioritize ideology and has continually 
committed South Africa onto the path that he views as best benefiting all interest 
groups. This coincides with the 'broad church' mentality that has always been the 
tradition of the AN C and was entrenched during the negotiations. This however, 
often means that the communication of policy becomes ambiguous as a fusion of 
ideals generally reflects the reality. 
It has become no surprise therefore, that his election to president has meant an 
intensification of the GEAR hegemonic project in South Africa. GEAR for the 
Mbeki school, is more than an economic policy, it is the foundation of future 
South Africa's commitment to market principles and the entrenchment of political 
power for the ANC (Lodge, 1999). His vision is for the solidification of a 
partnership between the ANC led state and an ANC bound black driven private 
sector. As has been proven thus far, the political transformation has led to the 
ANC control of the public sphere as whites have subsequently rationalized change 
in the solace of the control of the economic sphere. As economics increasingly 
becomes important in a world dominated by the global economy, it becomes 
vitally important for the ANC as a political party, to take a hold of its own 











the private sector and the vitally important flow of domestic investment. Only 
then can the ANC attack poverty and inequality as it views fit (Mbeki, 1998). 
Schrire (1998) writes in an article, Thabo's Republic, that Mbeki would find it 
exceptionally difficult to accept that after all he had to endure to become 
president, the success or failure of his administration would eventually be judged 
by white capital. In a free South Africa this power dynamic would have to 
change. Mbeki's views on economic policy and its ideal relationship with 
politics, has much to do with his history. 
Mbeki was born in the Transkei in 1942 into a family deeply entrenched in the 
ANC tradition. His father, Govan Mbeki, was a well-respected ANC communist 
member and journalist (Mbeki, 1999). His affiliation with books was 
immediately prevalent as he would spend much time in seclusion in the company 
of his father's library. He became literate at an early age and would spend much 
of his early years reading letters from mineworkers in Johannesburg to family in 
the Transkei. He would soon be deeply engulfed in the politics of migrant 
workers and how the system was tearing the rural African community apart. 
His first association with organizational politics took place during his time at 
Lovedale College, which proved the genesis of many ANC activists. He would 
join the Youth League at the age of 14, which was 2 years earlier than the norm. 
It was during this time that he learnt the history, philosophy and ideology of the 
ANC. He would soon connect the South African struggle with the rest of the 
continent with icons such as Nkrumah of Ghana being influential. On completing 
his high school education he traveled the country and became based in the PWV 
(Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging) region. He took full advantage of spending 
invaluable time in the presence of liberation stalwarts such as Duma Nokiwe, 











Lodge (1999) identifies that Mbeki's scholarly potential was identified early on by 
Oliver Tambo, who realized that if Mbeki remained in South Africa he would be 
arrested for long periods of time and his talents would be wasted. After a brief 
detention in the 1950's, Tambo managed to utilize his influence to fund Mbeki's 
higher education at the University of Sussex. It was in England that his views on 
economics would be shaped. He completed his MA in economics and soon 
became involved in representing the movement on a global level. Following 
work in the ANC office in London, and stints in Nigeria, Botswana and 
Swaziland, Mbeki would operate under the guidance of Tambo in Lusaka. From 
1975 he would become the party's political secretary and Tambo's official 
speechwriter. His rise to power included being elected to the ANC's National 
Executive in 1978, the director of information in 1984 and the head of 
international affairs in 1989. This was before being hand picked by Mandela for 
the deputy-presidency in 1994 and eventual presidency in 1999 (Lodge, 1999). 
Mbeki was well known for being a strong proponent of the negotiated settlement 
in the 1980s and soon became a leading diplomat in the movement. He has 
largely been accredited with being part of the think-tank behind ideas such as the 
GNU and the Sunset Clauses. During the early years of contact with the NP 
during the 1980s in Lusaka and Europe, Apartheid officials would often be hosted 
by Mbeki. Sparks (1994) writes that this was often a ploy by Tambo to throw the 
white administration off guard. He was fully aware that the white officials were 
expecting the communist militancy that the NP propaganda mission had 
perpetuated. Yet, white officials would encounter this western educated, welI-
spoken and democratically driven economist, whose vision for a free South Africa 
did not have the radical dimena that was anticipated. His corporatist ideals were 
particularly encouraging to white business. Therefore, before the official 
negotiations in 1990, he would soon have the respect of South African 
businessmen and politicians. Although he took a back seat to Ramophosa during 
Codesa, he was well noted for being the dominant player in the successful effort 











settlement. And, he was the key player in ending the political violence in Kwa-
Zulu Natal leading up to the elections. His education, understanding and 
diplomatic skills under a crisis was well noted in these incidences. This was a 
pivotal move in avoiding mass violent unrest at the time of the 1994 elections 
(Lodge, 1999). 
It is interesting to note that Mbeki was brought up on the diet of the SACP due to 
his father's involvement in the organization. He himself was in fact on the 
Politburo of the SACP in the 1970s and was largely considered on the ideological 
'left' of the ANC (Lodge, 1999). He concluded his Communist Party activities 
long before he returned to South Africa, and high-ranking SACP members such as 
Joe Slovo, were well known to support Ramaphosa to succeed Mandela. Mbeki, 
as with most ANC officials, does not neatly fit into an ideological spectrum and is 
progressive on some issues and conservative on others. It is well known however, 
that economically speaking, his Sussex education combined with long periods 
spent with the ANC exile elite's, has put him firmly in the neo-liberal school. He 
follows a non-populist style that thrives on intelligence and consistency, as 
opposed to physical charisma and rhetoric. He was dominant in the 
discontinuation of the RDP and its office in the presidency. When speaking to 
critics of GEAR in the movement, he has been known to warn party members of 
betraying the movement by 'fake revolutionary posturing'. This is when 
addressing those who in his opinion, continue to thrash out struggle slogans and 
empty rhetoric without having an understanding of what is possible and what is 
practical. 
Although being firmly identified in the class-centered approach based on the 
solidification of a black capitalist class, he is not unpopular amongst the ANC 
'left'. And, his adherence to economic fundamentals as an approach to economic 
restructuring has gained the support of the business community. Although he has 
been noted to be exceptionally frustrated at white business's inaction towards his 











entrenchment of investor confidence. This is a realty that has led to large levels 
of capital flight that continues to cripple the country. In Mbeki's opinion, black 
control of these large levels of capital will end this detrimental outcome, and 
would contribute to the attainment of a patriotic private sector (Mbeki, 1998). 
Mbeki's presidency has shown an engagement in the realities of the international 
political economy. Mbeki's visionary status as the leader of the new generation of 
democratically driven African leaders, has endured him to be very popular 
abroad. He is a visionary sophisticated leader who was hand picked to lead South 
Africa out of the Cold War era and into the new global order of globalization. He 
has been key in transforming the ANC from a revolutionary liberation movement 
into a ruling party of a leading developing economy (Lodge, 1999). 
(b) Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
"If the national conference adopts the draft resolutions on empowerment - which 
include the intensification of government support for small and medium 
enterprises as a critical component of empowerment the state is likely to playa 
much more active role than it has done in the past." S 'thembiso Msomi 
BEE is a defining point of the GEAR plan for the eradication of poverty and the 
narrowing of inequality. Once the decision had been made to engage in a growth 
strategy as opposed a nationalistic route, the enrichment of a black middle class 
became the governmental priority. It is argued by the likes of Mbeki, Erwin and 
Manuel that once a black middle class becomes a reality, the growth that would 
be achieved would result in the eventual relief for those on the ground. This 
deracialization of South Africa's top tier was the result of the corporatist solution 
that was decided upon during the elite scenario planning of the negotiations. This 
was a bargaining process between labor, business and the state, to replace mass 
protest and civil unrest. These respective trade-offs were placed firmly in the 












This process viewed many unionists such as the head of the NUM, Ramophosa, 
defecting from unionism to the private sector. The corporatist solution has 
strengthened the interests of the powerful and has had the result of the sidelining 
of small business, the unemployed, rural communities and other weaker interests. 
Adam, Slabbert and Moodley (1997) describe that, "when union leaders become 
partners in profit-making business enterprises, the nature of old-style class 
antagonism changes fundamentally" (1997: 146). 
The struggle has now entered the boardrooms of corporate South Africa. Due to 
global constraints of privatization, the new government could not follow the rest 
of the continent by solving racial inequality by turning to the hiring power of the 
public service. The ANC could not employ a mass of black beaurocrats as has 
occurred around the continent, as privatization has meant the down sizing of 
government. The ANC has thus turned to the private sector for a source of 
enrichment for its constituency. Despite the predominance of the ANC 
politically, Adam, Slabbert and Moodley (1997) explain the crucial nature of the 
relationship between government and business with to regards delivery. The 
private sector needs conducive governmental economic policy for it to prosper in 
market driven activity. On the other hand, the state is heavily reliant on 
investment, growth and expertise. 
The ANC has utilized the spectrum of neo-liberal economics to further black 
involvement in conglomerates, and to thus utilize this as a stepping-stone to 
narrowing the inequality of the nation. This is to create an ANC loyal business 
community. A former Vula operative is quoted as saying, "I am a good capitalist 
precisely because I was such a good communist." (1997: 166). The successful 
embourgeoisement of the liberation is signaled by the movement of top union 
officials to the head of corporations such as Anglo American Corporation. It has 
been argued that the relationship between the ANC and business is far closer now 











relay a story of how in 1982 Harry Oppenheimer confessed that he could not pick 
up the phone with Prime-Minister Vorster without interpreters. Botha is well 
known for not even wanting to be in the same room as Oppenheimer, a leader of 
the conglomerate that carried the South African economy. Therefore, despite a 
common interest and dependence, nowhere else in the world was the political and 
business elite so ethnically and socially divided as under Apartheid. Pretorious 
has been quoted as saying, "the exclusionary nature of Afrikaner nationalism did 
not allow consultation between government and English dominated business to be 
seen" (1997:170). 
This has been countered by a close relationship that initially emerged between 
Oppenheimer and Mandela. In fact, when Mandela personally phoned 20 of 
South Africa's leading companies for a R 1 million campaign donation, 19 
complied (1997: 171). This is not a reflection of a political or ideological 
affiliation, but rather an expedient relationship where both parties need each 
other. The ANC 'left' immediately realized that South Africa is not isolated, and 
all from Slovo, Manuel and Erwin have made this realization and have adapted to 
the current reality. "Many South African liberators have finally learned the one 
great lesson that Lenin taught his western sympathizers, which was not how to 
overthrow capitalism but how to recognize and utilize the greed that generates it" 
(1997: 173). 
A new wealthy black middle class has benefited the most from the negotiated 
settlement and has largely unashamedly followed the consumerist culture of 
previous years. A new self-confidence characterizes this group who measure 
South Africa's progress in line with American habits and consumerism. The state 
has been viewed as a source of enrichment and not a delivery agent for the people. 
This has not gone unnoticed by those below as more and more protest action has 
emerged in response to frustration at those 'comrades' who have now prioritized 











Bond (2000) highlights that by the time of GEAR's 1996 introduction, BEE was 
largely acclaimed as a sham. There were 300 BEE beneficiaries as the white 
establishment sought black faces to gain access to the new state. Therefore, a 
privileged few amongst the new were assimilated into the old, as a handful were 
immensely enriched. It was largely viewed as a strategy of counter-insurgency as 
opposed a genuine commitment to reform. A key focus of GEAR's BEE 
employment strategy was the small business sector. Therefore, initial success was 
achieved in small industries such as the taxi service, shebeen's, township and 
inner city spaza shop's, and construction (Bond, 2000). For example, the shebeen 
industry defeated South African Breweries (SAB) in 1990 over the issue of the 
cost of wholesale beer in the townships. However, inherent market failure began 
to plague the small business sector as loan defaults, bankruptcy, overproduction 
and competition began to tear at the fiber of the townships. Taken from Meshack 
Khosa's Oxford dissertation, "Unavoidably, crises associated with capitalist 
accumulation are evident in the industry, namely record levels of default on taxi 
loans; over-supply of vehicles in taxi ranks; desperate monopoly pricing practices; 
intensified exploitation of labor; driver speed up; violent taxi feuds, which all 
reflect the growing intensity of the crises" (Bond, 2000:41). Hawkers and spaza 
shop owners remain survivalists as the profits have not been forthcoming. The 
2002 budget speech continued to highlight this sector as the major source of 
employment and tax cuts have been wholesale. 
For the black middle class BEE has become a very lucrative endeavor. BEE has 
now become the economic arm of the liberation struggle for former 'comrades'. It 
has been the main challenge of the Department of Trade and Industry (DT!) to 
make BEE a fundamental pillar of economic development and to make the 
process part of South Africa's global competitiveness. As investment 
accumulation became the major priority of the new dispensation, major FDI 
initiatives often accompanied a BEE clause. Enterprise magazine explains that," 
BEE is about targeted problTams aimed at increasing the participation of black 











(2001: 18). In other words, it is an initiative that campaigns for blacks to 
economically participate in the same sphere as mainstream business and not as a 
separate entity. 
The late 1990s were a difficult time for the new BEE movement as they 
discovered the temperamental nature of the market and the fickle attitude of 
investors. The economic struggle for equality would become wrought with 
difficulties. The initial entrance point was via pyramid conglomerate 
shareholdings. The best example would be Don Ncube's Real Africa Holdings, 
which was supported by African Life Insurance and Real Africa Durolink 
investment/merchant banking (Bond, 2000). This was an insurance-based 
acquisition strategy that eventually turned to information technology. Another 
major BEE example was in 1993 when Sanlam sold a stake in Metropolitan Life 
to a black economic consortium called New African Investments Limited (NAIL), 
which was headed by Dr Nthoto Matlana. Further black business consortiums 
included interests in Pepsi, National Sorghum Breweries and African Bank. By 
the late 1990s black business began to experience major teething problems as 
bank rates soared and the lSE index began to plummet (Bond, 2000). 
Nail controlled 10hnic had reached nearly R70 a share in April 1998 but had 
crashed to R21 a few months later. In 1999 Ramophosa was forced out of Nail by 
his partners and set up his own banking based conglomerate. In 1999 Nail was 
engulfed in controversy as the executives awarded themselves a R35 million 
personal bonus for good performance. By the tum of the century empowerment 
companies such as Brimstone, Women's Investment Portfolio, Sekunjalo, 
Pamodzi and Cosatu's Kapano ke Matla, all fared badly and BEE was largely 
ridiculed (Bond, 2000). As a Financial Mail article of that year explained, "The 
model is flawed, some individuals are wealthier, but few jobs have been created. 
Where there should be new productive capacity, there is massive debt. And at 
stake is not merely the fortunes of a few companies, but the very legitimacy of the 











One sector that has actively embraced the BEE movement has been the 
traditionally conservative mining industry. Under Minerals and Energy Minister, 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, legislation has been sent out that effectively transfers 
the mining sector over to the state. The new mining bill actively allows the state 
the capacity to allocate mineral rights to new mining developments that shall 
prioritize the previously disadvantaged (Financial Mail, 2002). BEE has taken off 
in leaps and bounds in gold and recent developments have seen a 50-50 joint 
venture between Harmony Gold and a BEE venture called African Rainbow 
Minerals. Under CEO Patrice Motsepe, African Rainbow Minerals has entered 
the 'premier league' of South African business and the mining sector in particular. 
The mining bill has not gone unopposed with many believing that traditional 
mining companies will be prejudiced by state allocation. The fear is that political 
allocations could result in contracts being awarded to the wrong developers who 
would not fully exploit South Africa's major assets (Financial Mail, 2002). BEE 
is well established in the mining seetor and the recent tremendous performanee by 
gold has done much to strengthen the process. 
A defining moment in the BEE initiative came in 2001 with the intended launch 
of Safcoc, which was a merger between the South African Chamber of business 
(Sacob) and the National Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc). Sacob has 
generally been the broad organization representing South African business, whilst 
Nafcoc is an organization representing black business interests. The merger 
ripped the BEE movement down the middle and touched on sensitive issues such 
as the trade off between non-racialism and racial empowering. At the heart of the 
debate was whether a merger between traditionally white organizations with BEE 
initiatives was appropriate bearing in mind that black South Africans have yet to 
achieve socio-economic liberation. And, whether in this day and age of 
reconciliation, there remained room for black only organizations. The Black 
Business Council (BBC) believed that the merger was premature and thus would 











made the argument that a merger with Sacob would give black business greater 
access and would contribute to greater investor confidence. Then Sacob CEO 
Kevin Wakeford explained that, "Racial exclusivity is a crime in South Africa. 
We have to engage international bodies such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) as one body. Enterprise development, empowerment, and 
economic growth will not be expected if we work separately" (Enterprise 
Magazine, 200 I: 16). Both Wakeford and his Nafcoc counterpart Sabelo 
Macingwane, viewed the launch as a 'unity vehicle' and not a merger. It would be 
a 24-month process that would be accompanied by a transformation imperative. 
Government largely stood on the sidelines of the process but it is believed that it 
would be ideal to have one voice representing business (Enterprise Magazine, 
2001:16). 
Although all agree that the process is imperative and will take a long time before 
reaping rewards, however, BEE has been wrought with infighting amongst those 
who formerly stood side by side in the struggle against apartheid. Mandela and 
Mbeki have been known to publicly criticize those at the forefront of the 
movement for reducing the initiative to petty arguments. One such example was 
what the Mail and Guardian called the 'Clash of the Comrades'. This was a court 
battle over a trust set up for former political prisoners who have continually 
complained of never seeing their money. The battle was between Makuna Trust 
(led by BEE kingpin Tokyo Sexwale) and Safika Investment Holdings. Makuna 
accused Safika of appropriating millions of Rands in M-cell shares, money that 
ought to have been shared among the former prisoners who subscribe to the trust. 
Eventually, Makuna won a court order to have Safika investigated by the DTI, 
and Safika retaliated by suing Makana for defamation of character (Mail and 
Guardian, 2002). 
An article in the Business Day (l October, 2002) emphasizes the ANC's 
commitment to ensuring a broader black stake in the national economy and a 











frustration at the lack of community engagement at the expense of individual 
enrichment. "The new approach articulated by the ANC at its national policy 
conference will see the departure from individual black economic empowerment 
to broad-based community involvement. It will also introduce quotas and time 
frames for the participation of black people in the economy. This might result in 
communities owning stakes in the tourism sector, mining ventures and 
restructured state assets" (Business Day, lead article Oct, 2002). 
BEE has been a key component of the GEAR policy, which gives a clear example 
of the workings of neo-liberal economics on a developing state. As the global 
economy shifts from the exportation of primary goods to the manufacturing 
sector, South Africa has followed suit. Although mining continues to be the 
leader in BEE initiatives, the government has identified the telecommunications, 
fishing and Information Technology (IT) sectors for BEE intensification. It is 
well known that South Africa is one of the top cell phone users and producers in 
the world and have sought to take their expertise into the African market. An 
increased drive has occurred for South Africa to be at the forefront of the 
expansion of science and technology onto the continent. This is a realization that 
in a globalized economy manufacturing is the future, and African countries have 
to diversify their markets in order to survive. 
The ANC has identified this as an opportunity to shape the South African 
economy. BEE guru Ramaphosa states that, "Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the political transition does not provide us with the motivation to pursue black 
economic empowerment. The motivation was always there. Instead it provides 
the opportunity. And the opportunity is being exploited. Four years ago black 
people owned and controlled only 0,3% of the market capitalization of the stock 
exchange, they now control and own 10,3%" (Arnold, 2000:95). 
BEE has become a method utilized by the ruling party to entrench neo-liberal 











explains, "As the ANC leadership began to worry about ensunng long-term 
sustainable growth - and hence also its long-term political future, its policies 
became more pro-business" (Marais, 200 I: 138). As a response to the growing 
need for an active relationship between business and government in a capitalist 
economy, the ruling party has realized the increasing importance of a patriotic 
private sector. Capital flight and lethargic investment continue to thwart 
government initiatives as economic control remains in white hands. The goal of 
Mbeki and others, to create a black capitalist class, has been viewed as imperative 
by the ANC elite in order to gain control over their own future. The key problem 
has been that the government has spoken of transformation, whilst black 
companies have spoken of BEE. Whilst government continues to utilize the 
process as a strategy to address the poor, BEE continues to focus on the 
empowernlent of the new black business elite who have become farther and 
farther removed from the townships and rural areas. After all, the founding 
fathers of liberal economics do teach us that in capitalist society there is a natural 












ANALYSIS: 'IS THERE GOLD AT THE END OF THE RAINBOW?' 
(a) South Africa and the Global Economy 
How then has the new South Africa adapted to the global economy and what are 
the forces driving the national economy forward? The post-apartheid South 
Africa signaled its stance to the global economy by signing the GATT agreement 
in December of 1993. After the 1994 elections, Ministers Manuel and Erwin 
removed trade tariffs faster than required in key areas. In the same year South 
Africa decided to take a moderate loan from the Bretton Woods institutions that 
effectively serviced apartheid debt. The letter of intent that the new 
administration attached to the loan, signaled the new government's commitment to 
macroeconomic reform and placed South Africa firmly on a route to an outward 
orientated market economy. The new South Africa's devaluation of the national 
currency and the phasing out of exchange controls in order to attract FDI, has 
meant that the new democracy has integrated itself as a developing nation in the 
belief that normalizing adjustments would bring the economy in line with the 
global consensus (Bond, 2000). 
Marais (2001) and Arnold (2000) outline that the new South African economy 
combines three important features. Firstly, a minerals and energy complex that 
extracts commodity exports for foreign exchange and an agricultural sector that 
has made South Africa largely self-sufficient. Secondly, it has an industrial sector 
in the semi-industrialized phase, which is an area that needs further concentration 
in order to become globally competitive. Thirdly, South Africa has developed 
information, communications and transport systems of the sophistication of the 
first world. The advanced phase of this sector has put the new democracy at a 
considerable advantage over other developing economies. And, I would add, the 
new economy has a rapidly expanding tourism sector that has grown considerably 
as political stability has proven long-standing. South Africa has been rated the 











that put most of the globe on a heightened security alert. The relative political 
stability that the ANC government has provided, has meant that South Africa has 
increasingly begun to host numerous global conferences such as the World 
Conference on Race and Racism in Durban in 2001 and the Conference on World 
Sustainable Development in 2002. 
Despite the political and economic restructuring that has witnessed the advent of 
the new South Africa, Egyptian political economist Samir Amin, believes that 
South Africa remains a microcosm of the four worlds of the global capitalist 
economy. This reality was entrenched by the arrival of British imperialism that 
witnessed the advent of industrialization and the racial profiling of labor that 
remains to this day. There remains a first world white society living in 
international conditions, a third world urban black community whom resemble 
most modern industrializing third world urban dwellers, and a fourth world of 
rural peasants who remain in the age of tribal traditionalism (Amin, 1993). 
It has been the challenge of the new administration to fundamentally overcome 
this racially demarcated reality_ Amin assess four types of developing economies 
in the global economy and attempts to fit South Africa into this paradigm. Firstly, 
there are those developing countries that have moved into the industrialization 
phase and have become successfully competitive. These countries include South 
East Asia and the major Latin American countries. Secondly, there are those 
countries that have attempted to industrialize but have failed to become 
competitive or have required major restructuring. These include South Africa, 
Egypt and some Arab states. Thirdly, there are those countries that have 
remained pre-industrial but have succeeded in the exportation of traditional 
exports such as agriculture, minerals and oil. Such countries include the Gulf 
States and some African countries such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Then 
finally, there are those who have not industrialized and have failed to promote 












Post-Apartheid South Africa through its macroeconomic strategy has sort to 
redress its position in this hierarchy. As mentioned, during the transition it was 
believed that the problem was political and not economic and that once the 
political sphere stabilized the economy would grow from this foundation. South 
Africa has not been able to detach itself from the most economically desperate 
continent in the world, and the massive international goodwill shown to the new 
Mandela administration did not yield the anticipated investment. The new 
economy has not been able to attract some of the 30 per cent swell in world trade 
since the late 1980's. The neo-liberal friendly economic strategy of GEAR, 
although improving, has also not sparked the kind of investment needed for 
sustainable growth and development. 
The Mineral and Agricultural sector continues to carry the economy, as the 
industrial sector has not been able to keep abreast of international technology 
developments. This has been identified and addressed as the manufacturing 
industry has been focused upon along with information technology and 
telecommunications. These sectors have been prioritized for BEE. The results 
still have to be witnessed however. The continued reliance on minerals and 
energy has meant an increased vulnerability to price fluctuations as the global 
economy has moved on from these products and as the national economy remains 
reliant on imports, labor from outside its borders and foreign technology. In 
short, this has meant that South Africa remains a typical developing nation as a 
traditional exporter and importer of capital goods and technologies (Marais, 
2001). 
South Africa as an integrated developing economy is pegged to the performance 
of the global economy, this has continued to mean that its fate has remained on 
developments elsewhere, notably the center of the global economy in the West. 
As this paper has proven, the West does not always have the well being of such a 











Steel Tariffs and Farming subsidies by the Bush administration in the USA. This 
continually illustrates that Western governments will continue to prioritize 
domestic political popularity over the development of marginal economies. Both 
such protectionist measures cripple the competitive capabilities of the Third 
World economy. Added to this, the September 11 th 200 I attacks on the World 
Trade center in New York City, have meant an increase in global market 
instability. This has meant that security and not poverty has become the priority 
of global leaders. Furthermore, a series of scandals in corporate America, such as 
the Enron debacle and the recent WorldCom collapse, has meant that global 
capitalism is in a state of much uncertainty. So long as examples of corruption 
and greed continue to diminish faith in corporate America, developing economies 
pegged to global success such as South Africa will continue to falter. 
(b) 'Growth with Equity' 
On the basis of this reading of international life, what could possibly be done 
domestically to achieve the original goals of the South African experience to 
eradicate poverty and to narrow inequality? What can South Africa do to place 
the nation on a road to growth in a volatile and unpredictable global economy? 
The fact of the matter is that South Africa cannot isolate itself, especially at the 
foot of the most economically unproductive continent in the world. The new 
democracy cannot escape the influences of globalization and needs to positively 
participate in the globalization process. This research has argued that the state 
does have a positive role to play in the enabling of the national economy. South 
Africa has to be attuned to the dynamics of international capital markets and the 
economic policies of the north, along with those who are South Africa's major 
trading partners. The field of fiscal policy remains a key area of relative freedom 
for the developing state. It is the reality that no credible economic policy can 
possibly elleveate the country's chronic levels of poverty and inequality in the 











This paper supports the argument of a working paper for the 'Africa Institute for 
Policy Analysis and Economic Integration' (AIPA) called Growth with Equity. At 
the heart of the argument is the realization in the current global order of 
globalization that GEAR as a macroeconomic plan needs to prioritize the uplifting 
of the young democracy. If ideal levels of 6 percent sustainable growth are to be 
achieved in the new century, South Africa needs to improve international 
competitiveness, attract investment and create jobs (AIPA, 1997:3). 
There is an inherent assumption that equity and growth are mutually exclusive 
ideals, as higher growth is founded on increased inequality. While this may be 
true in many instances, it is not a fixed truth and is not a necessary reality for a 
nation in the development process. AlP A points out that extended research has 
shown that inequality has decreased with economic growth. Government policies 
remain key to the alleviation of poverty. While the global economy does dictate 
domestic economic practice, South Africa is free to utilize the global reality to 
empower the disenfranchised. 
Job creation is the only way to address poverty and to increase employment 
opportunities there needs to be sustainable growth. It is the responsibility of the 
ANC-Ied state to firstly build on the relative political stability to ensure that 
satisfactory measures are in place to achieve such growth and to importantly insist 
that sustained growth has a social responsibility to the nation's poor. A 
replication of the apartheid two- tier system is unacceptable in the long run. The 
aims of redistribution must be for the incomes of the poor to outgrow that of the 
rich (AlP A, 1997). 
For consistent growth to be achieved the state needs to invest in its people by 
training the labor force to alleviate a growing skills crisis. The new global 
economy is based on knowledge and information, it is vital for South Africa to 
produce talented professionals to positively participate in the economy. The focus 











Small business needs to break free of survivalist tendencies and to become a 
stable foundation for black entrepreneurship. Mbeki has been noted to have 
mentioned that South Africa needs to find new and innovative ways to create 
employment. It is the job of government to ensure that growth has a social 
responsibility by maintaining consistent levels of service delivery, to combat 
lawlessness and to invest in easing the plight of the unemployed (AlP A, 1997). 
The engmes of growth are exports and investment. The exchange rate 
depreciation of 1996 was used to kick start growth and competitiveness. This was 
followed by tight monetary and fiscal policies accompanied by wage restraint. 
There has been an emphasis on deficit reduction with the creation of an 
environment free to private spending. The entire project has been underpinned by 
the intention to make South Africa investor friendly. Thus far the results have 
been decidedly mediocre. The anticipated FDI has not come and domestic capital 
has proven non-committal to transformation and change. Arnold (2000) 
emphasizes that white big business must invest in the new South Africa as they 
once did the apartheid state, as the success of the new country is reliant on the 
active participation of all its people. As the market proves to be volatile, capital 
flight continues to cripple development initiatives. This has meant that GEAR's 
employment predictions have not reached desirable levels, which in turn has 
meant a lack of poverty relief (AlP A, ] 997). 
Despite these short term set backs, the firm policy of growth led initiatives must 
remain consistent to fight negative perceptions and to place South Africa at the 
top of the developing pile. Even if job creation is not immediately attained in 
sufficient numbers, sustained growth will benefit equity through the increased 
availability of resources for redistribution. It is pivotal for this redistribution to 
seek to move beyond the inherent structural racial and regional make-up. An 












In sum, South Africa needs to work within the confines of the new global order to 
develop a homegrown strategy to achieve growth with equity. Global experience 
has taught us that openness is essential and the manufacturing and industry related 
sectors are pivotal for competitiveness and the reduction on the reliance on 
unsupportive global forces. Development is driven by domestic and foreign 
investment, with a concrete relationship between capital and government key to 
this reality. There needs to be domestic fiscal constraint and higher levels of 
personal savings. And, there needs to be an economic working relationship with 
regional developing markets. Government needs to make sure that the resources 
made available from these economic fundamentals are actively utilized to benefit 
those whom apartheid ignored (AlP A, 1997). This is to invest in the people 
through education, health and security. 
South Africa needs to work from the foundational goals articulated in the RDP to 
promote coherence and use the current neo-liberal reality to serve the people. The 
ANC has now become a representative for many interest groups both rich and 
poor. Nattrass and Seekings (1998) explain that although there are high 
expectations amongst the poor of the ANC constituency, there is a sense of 
realism and patience in terms of expectations for fundamental change. Many poor 
South Africans do detect evidence of improvements or at least genuine attempts to 
provide basic freedoms. This immense loyalty has allowed the ANC to avoid 
short- term populist policies in favor of a long-term growth strategy intended to 
service redistribution. This has compounded political stability that must be 
utilized for economic liberation. The stakes are high as the window period 
becomes ever shorter, constructive results need to be forthcoming as an 
increasingly disillusioned impoverished society eroding towards ungovernability 












"The challenge for politieal science ... is that a purely domestic analysis is no 
longer enough: it misses central determinants of domestic problems, because we 
no longer understand politics within countries - what we still conveniently call 
'domestic politics' without comprehensively understanding the nature of the 
linkages between national economies and the world economy, and changes in 
such linkages" (Busch, 2000: 44) 
It has been the task of this research to clearly investigate the complexities 
surrounding the interrelationships between the national economic practice of 
South Africa and the international political economy. This research was based on 
the fundamental theme that the nature of post-apartheid South Africa's at times 
ambiguous vision, is a direct result of the ANC-led government's belief that a 
developing economy is placed in a vice of restriction and constraint. The belief is 
that is especially true in South Africa due to the corporatist nature of the transition 
and in the face of globalization. A context of exploitation and struggle is vital to 
such an analysis. The ANC's evolution from a liberation movement representing 
the broad church of South Africa's oppressed peoples, to becoming the ruling 
party of a developing economy, has witnessed the government continuously 
having to juggle varying ideals and objectives. The ANC has attempted to 
overcome this by adopting a hegemonic project of pragmatism with regards to 
economic restructuring. 
The democratic movement's economic vision for a free South Africa was always 
tabled in the Freedom Charter. However, by the time of the unbanning of the 
various arms of the liberation movement, the nature of IPE had fundamentally 
ehanged. By this time the Cold War context had evaporated and the 'hype' of 
globalization had reached full peak. This research has argued that the ANC's 











regards to globalization theory we saw that the literature contained three waves, 
which reflect the intellectual evolution of the process. 
The first wave depicted the neo-liberal victory of business elites who described 
the creation of a 'borderless world' in a time period described as 'the end of 
history.' This school views the triumph of the market over the state and positively 
presents a story of inevitability and convergence. First wave thinkers strongly 
believe that globalization is the driving force behind the homogenization of 
culture, macroeconomic policy, democratic politics and a minimalist state. 
The second wave largely represents a critique of such determinism and believes 
that this unevenly represented phenomena, is largely over-exaggerated by first 
wave thinkers. The school relates that present levels of capital flows are not 
dissimilar to the levels experienced before World War 1. They believe that 
politics and the state need to be incorporated into the debate as a facilitator of the 
process. Second wave thinkers argue that governance at national and international 
level is possible and is needed. This is as the process, if left uncontrolled, is 
largely uneven and amounts to nothing more than the intensification of capital 
among the 'triad'. They dismiss the claim made that MNCs live in a borderless 
world wherein they reflect no allegiance to any nation-state. Second wave 
thinkers posit that powerful nation-states are the agents behind the process and 
have designed it to suit their own gains. Therefore, what first wave thinkers 
describe as globalization is in fact 'triadization.' 
The third wave literature is a new field of analysis and seeks to build on the 
second wave's sentiments regarding the need for the integration of political 
dynamics. They largely concur with the general critique concerning the uneven 
nature of globalization. This is a school that comprehensively seeks to 
'demystify' globalization and to present its complexities in the quest to avoid 
simplification. It is a 'post-disciplinary' perspective of global studies, which 











as the independent rather than the dependent variable'. In sum, second and third 
wave thinkers prioritize for scholars the fundamental need to pay witness to the 
'deep political character of the process.' 
During the time of the negotiations and scenario planning sessions of the 1990's 
the first wave was at the peak of its influence and eventually had a direct causal 
link to the subsequent settlement. Once in government the ruling party began to 
realize the need for measured state influence and GEAR reflected the ANC's 
interchangeability between the adherence to the state and the market. When 
contemplating South Africa's seeming embracement of conservative fiscal policy, 
one needs to remember these 'juggling acts' and overarching influences. 
As outlined by Castells in this research, national fiscal policy need not directly 
reflect the Washington Consensus. Although certain fundamentals are considered 
non-negotiable, fiscal policy does allow the freedom to implement that which best 
suits the variances of a particular society. In this guise the state needs to invest in 
its people and to insist that South Africa becomes a diversified knowledge based 
society. This is key in the fostering of a positive renewal project. 
A full understanding of the nature of Apartheid is fundamental when discussing 
the political economic future of South Africa. One needs to understand the 
stakeholders in this context of racism, inequality and poverty. This paper 
researched the South African experience from the transition, to witness how the 
new democracy approached political economic transformation from isolation to 
being incorporated into the globalization process. While it is true that the state 
seems to be adhering to the conservative path with regards to economic policy, 
the state has remained central in the restructuring process and has been the central 
agent of initiative and investment. Therefore, the South African case represents 
the 'complexities' of the interrelationship between globalization theory and 
national practice, with the state positively engaging the globalization reality 











Our case study of South Africa investigated the practical role of an African 
nati6n-state within this third wave of globalization. The negotiations for the new 
South Africa from 1990 transformed South Africa into a country ready to engage 
with global forces. The ANC ruling party has soon realized the fickle nature of 
global investors and the pains of being reliant on events elsewhere. South Africa 
learned that the foundation of any country intending on integrating into the global 
economy is political stability based on stark democratic principles. The 
dominance of the ANC has thus far allowed for this reality. The economic 
planning of an African state such as South Africa has become arduous in an 
international system that tends to exacerbate global inequality. As security and 
not poverty continues to dominate International Relations, South Africa has had to 
combine integration with strong homegrown initiatives. The BEE campaign has 
been analyzed as the ANC's solution to this balancing act, the initiative has been 
plagued by teething problems and has been critiqued for compounding the 
inequality that it sought to overcome. Only by effectively finding the balance 
between engaging globalization with domestic redistribution and development, 
shall South Africa achieve their utopian land, one free of hunger and poverty. 
Only then will apartheid have been defeated and will South Africa truly be free. 
Thus in conclusion, we must recall the patterns and causes of inequality in South 
African society. It is not purely variance in intelligence or inherent abilities. As 
Fischer (1996: 7, 10) puts it, "Social milieu and social policy create 
inequality ... and it will always be the socially constructed and changeable 
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